Paternalism, Tolerance, and Acceptance: Modeling the Evolution of Equal Protection in the Constitutional Canon by Tehranian, John
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 62 (2020-2021) 
Issue 5 Article 5 
4-1-2021 
Paternalism, Tolerance, and Acceptance: Modeling the Evolution 
of Equal Protection in the Constitutional Canon 
John Tehranian 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons 
Repository Citation 
John Tehranian, Paternalism, Tolerance, and Acceptance: Modeling the Evolution of Equal 
Protection in the Constitutional Canon, 62 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1615 (2021), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol62/iss5/5 
Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
PATERNALISM, TOLERANCE, AND ACCEPTANCE:




This Article proposes a legal taxonomy through which we can
model changes in interpretations and applications of antidis-
crimination principles to best understand the evolution of equal pro-
tection doctrine. The goal for doing so is two-fold. First, through a
careful exegesis of a wide range of equal protection cases from the
past hundred and fifty years, the analysis provides a positive theory
to chart how respect for minority rights can progress within a given
doctrinal space. Second, the analysis provides an unabashedly nor-
mative assessment of how closely a given legal regime comes to
accepting and celebrating the inherent dignitary interests of mar-
ginalized groups and the extent to which its jurisprudence begins to
subvert subordination practices. Consequently, the Article attempts
to trace both how far we have come and to criticize the potential
shortcomings of the extant body of jurisprudence from the Supreme
Court on issues related to equality. 
In advancing this evolutionary model of civil rights jurisprudence,
the Article charts the key characteristics of the three stages in the
development of equal protection under the law: paternalism, toler-
ance, and acceptance. In the process, the Article scrutinizes and
* A.B., Harvard University; J.D., Yale Law School. Paul W. Wildman Chair and
Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
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reassesses some of the most canonical decisions in the civil rights
firmament and considers how these purported hallmarks of pro-
gressive jurisprudence—from Justice Harlan’s prescient dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson and the Supreme Court’s rare moment of post-
Reconstruction racial awakening in Strauder v. West Virginia to
Mendez v. Westminster and Brown v. Board of Education, right
through the modern-day sexual-orientation triumvirate of Lawrence
v. Texas, Windsor v. United States, and Obergefell v. Hodges—fell
short in critical ways. In the end, the goal of this Article and the
model it presents is to encourage a more robust and fulsome notion
of equal protection—one that is proactive rather than reactive; one
that affirmatively renounces, rather than stays silent on, supremacist
ideologies; and one that uses the legal machinery of the state to
accept and celebrate the inalienable rights and worth of individuals
who are members of targeted groups.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes a legal taxonomy through which we can
model changes in interpretations and applications of antidiscrim-
ination principles to best understand the evolution of equal pro-
tection doctrine. The goal for doing so is twofold. First, the analysis
provides a positive theory to chart how respect for minority rights
can progress within a given doctrinal space. As such, this Article
seeks to explain the course of equal protection jurisprudence
through various stages of legal development. Second, the analysis
provides an unabashedly normative assessment of how closely a
given legal regime comes to accepting and celebrating the inherent
dignitary interests of marginalized groups and the extent to which
its jurisprudence begins to undo the impact of long-entrenched
prejudices. Consequently, the Article attempts to trace both how far
we have come and to scrutinize the potential shortcomings of the
extant body of jurisprudence from the Supreme Court on issues
related to equality.
Specifically, the Article conducts a close textual reading of a wide
range of equal protection cases of the past hundred and fifty years
to argue that juridical conceptions of minority rights have advanced
in roughly three stages: paternalism, tolerance, and acceptance. In
the first stage, courts, driven by noblesse oblige, reluctantly prohibit
discrimination on the grounds that those who warrant the govern-
ment’s protection cannot help what or who they are. In the process,
first-order protection expressly reaffirms hierarchy and tiers of
citizenship, thereby doing little, in practice, to address inequality or
challenge the supremacist ideologies underlying “proto-tolerant”
regimes. In the second stage, courts advance a less condescending
form of tolerance that rejects discrimination against minority
groups. But this judicial pivot is typically both laissez-faire in its
approach and instrumentalist in its drive. As such, it promotes tol-
erance primarily when doing so advances the praetorian interests
of the majority and those in power. Finally, in stage three, courts
actively solemnize the rights of minorities and reject structural
hierarchies that put that group on an unequal footing. As such, the
1620 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1615
law begins to play a role in actively resisting and subverting
subordination practices.1
In advancing this evolutionary model of civil rights jurisprudence,
the Article charts the key characteristics of these three stages of
advancement in the protection of minority rights. In the process, the
Article reassesses and critiques some of the most canonical decisions
in the civil rights firmament and considers how these purported
hallmarks of progressive jurisprudence—from Justice Harlan’s
prescient dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson2 and the Supreme Court’s
rare moment of post-Reconstruction racial awakening in Strauder
v. West Virginia3 to Mendez v. Westminster School District4 and
Brown v. Board of Education,5 right through the modern-day sexual
orientation triumvirate of Lawrence v. Texas,6 United States v.
Windsor,7 and Obergefell v. Hodges8—fell short in key ways. Based
on an exegesis of these cases, the Article posits that the work of
creating a society and legal system free of invidious discrimination
is not nearly done and that we can, and should, demand more from
the Court.
This Article begins by examining the proto-tolerance exhibited by
seemingly progressive decisions from the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. The starting point is Harlan’s celebrated
dissent in Plessy, which, despite its position against the constitu-
tionality of segregation, was imbued with a paternalistic approach
to the Fourteenth Amendment that fetishized formal colorblindness
1. As Michel Foucault has argued, modern forms of power often come in the form of “a
dynamic or network of non-centralised forces ... [that] are not random or haphazard, but
configure to assume particular historical forms,” Susan Bordo, Feminism, Foucault and the
Politics of the Body, in UPAGAINST FOUCAULT 179, 191 (Caroline Ramazanoglu ed., 1993), and
the law can play an active role in either metastasizing or opposing such forms. See generally
MICHEL FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 100-02 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978)
(describing the ability of the subordinated to resist power and domination); Michael Ryan,
Foucault’s Fallacy, in RECONSTRUCTING FOUCAULT 159, 171-72 (Ricardo Miguel-Alfonso &
Silvia Caporale-Bizzini eds., 1994) (“By designating the characteristics of one group—
heterosexual males—as an ideal ..., the Greek ideological discourses assured that the charac-
teristics of the other groups ... were excluded from qualification for power.”).
2. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
4. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
8. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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and ultimately supported White supremacy.9 As I argue, a closer
examination of Harlan’s other race-related jurisprudence, including
his seemingly inconsistent decisions in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States,10 United States v. Wong Kim Ark,11 and Cumming v.
Richmond County Board of Education,12 limns his consistently
circumscribed notion of equality. I also assess the impact of Harlan’s
trope of colorblindness in giving rise to a new first-order interpreta-
tion of equal protection in the modern period: the Supreme Court’s
recent jurisprudence on remedial race-based government action.
First-order notions of protection are, of course, not limited to
Harlan and his colorblindness progeny. As I further illustrate, even
the rare moments of victory for civil rights plaintiffs in such cases
as Strauder—which struck the facial prohibition of African Ameri-
cans from serving on juries13—perpetuated inequities and literally
established the legal machinery of White hegemony that would
come to dominate the post-Reconstruction/Jim Crow era. In the
limited “victories” related to other suspect classifications such as
gender, court decisions also reaffirmed patriarchy and grounded
decisions upholding the rights of female workers in the most
paternalistic of terms. In sum, these first-order cases are character-
ized by the reaffirmation of supremacist ideologies, the fetishization
of formal colorblindness, and facial neutrality in a manner that
severely constrains the scope of equal protection scrutiny by
elevating appearance over impact.
The analysis then turns its attention to second-order protection
cases, in which courts began to exhibit a more robust interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment that averts an overt embrace of
supremacist ideologies. Instead, courts started to demonstrate a
commitment to broader nondiscrimination principles. Nevertheless,
in second-order cases, protection is often grounded in conditional
language and the service of majority interests, rather than a
fulsome embrace of the dignitary interests of the targeted group. At
the same time, in these decisions, courts carefully dole out tolerance
9. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (joining Justice Field’s majority opinion).
11. 169 U.S. 649, 705-32 (1898) (Fuller, J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
13. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880).
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using a negative conception of the right to equality that ultimately
supports the maintenance of entrenched social hierarchies and tiers
of citizenship. The oft ignored but problematic aspects of Brown and
its processor case, Mendez v. Westminster (Mendez I),14 illustrate
these shortcomings. For all of its merit, the groundbreaking district
court decision in Mendez I still grounded its holding in the service
of White assimilatory interests and presumptions of cultural
superiority. Meanwhile, the appellate court decision cravenly failed
to reject the notion of inherent racial differences and left desegrega-
tion to the whimsies of the legislature.15 Brown also elided any
denunciation of White supremacy. Meanwhile, its piecemeal
approach to antidiscrimination principles precipitated predictably
devastating consequences for a large group of African American
professionals. Thus, as a close reading of both cases demonstrates,
these key landmarks in civil rights jurisprudence ultimately
continued to advance White hegemony. All the while, the watershed
holding in Lawrence, the Supreme Court’s celebrated foray into the
recognition of gay rights,16 suffered similar constraints. In Law-
rence, the Court’s tone of moral remove and its restrained and aloof
language epitomized the ultimately tolerant, but not celebratory,
basis of its holding and its negative conception of the equality to
which gays are entitled.
With the limitations of Mendez I, Brown, and Lawrence in mind,
I then ask, for aspirational purposes, what form a third-order level
of protection might take and how courts might ultimately achieve
it. To wrestle with this issue, I examine the seismic change in the
Supreme Court’s approach to sexual-orientation claims in recent
years, as illustrated by Windsor and Obergefell. Though I argue that
the Court has come close to third-order protection in these cases, a
careful analysis reveals their stubborn resistance to celebrating
acceptance and recognizing the inherent dignity interests of
marginalized groups.
In particular, I emphasize two key areas of caution as the law
attempts to evolve into third-order protection. First, I document how
the continuing fetishization of immutability in the equal protection
14. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
15. See Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez (Mendez II), 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
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calculus has impeded the realization of a jurisprudence of accep-
tance (rather than one of mere tolerance) and stymied the achieve-
ment of a more potent form of constitutional equality—both with
respect to sexual orientation and, more broadly, to other classifica-
tions that also have little or no link to merit and have a long history
of targeting on the basis of animus. As I argue, while the framing of
protected traits in immutable terms may help rationalize the early
stages of equal protection (paternalism and tolerance), it ultimately
stymies the cause of acceptance and restrains the structural impact
such rulings can have. Second, I fault the continued grounding of
civil rights protection in the replicating of majority culture and
lifestyles (for example, in the context of sexual orientation, “like-
straight” logic) and the service of assimilatory interests, as such a
tactic impairs individual and group autonomy and fails to give
sufficient weight to the dignity interests of minorities.
I conclude by considering objections to the taxonomy, including
concerns that a third-order vision of protection might vitiate in-
terests in judicial restraint and neutrality. With an examination of
the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Trump v. Hawaii,17 I also
caution that the taxonomy is certainly not meant to imply any
linear view of progress. In the end, the goal of this Article and the
model it presents is to encourage a more robust and fulsome notion
of equal protection—one that is proactive rather than reactive; one
that affirmatively renounces, rather than stays silent on, suprema-
cist ideologies; and one that uses the legal machinery of the state to
accept and celebrate the dignity of individuals who are members of
targeted groups.
17. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).









































































































18. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
20. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
23. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
24. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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I. PATERNALISM/NOBLESSE OBLIGE AND FIRST-ORDER PROTECTION
This Article’s analysis begins with an examination of one of the
most famous opinions in American history: Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s much-celebrated27 dissent in Plessy.28 Long vaunted for
its foresight and oft cited as the lone voice of reason during one
of the darkest moments in our jurisprudence—when the Supreme
Court gave segregation constitutional cover in 1896—Harlan’s
opinion presaged, by half a century, the ultimate demise of segre-
gation with Brown v. Board of Education.29 The opinion also earned
Harlan the moniker “the Great Dissenter.”30 Not surprisingly,
therefore, Harlan’s dissent in Plessy has long held top-tier status in
the civil rights canon.31
Yet an equanimous assessment of the opinion reveals that, for all
the accolades it has received, it still suffers from critical short-
comings. In particular, Harlan’s dissent epitomizes the perspectives
of first-order protection, which exhibits proto-tolerance driven by
paternalistic instincts. First-order protection finds its roots in
noblesse oblige and comes with all its attendant condescension. As
such, while it might ultimately come to the “right” result, it does not
hesitate to reaffirm White supremacy and, in the end, presents an
enervated vision of equal protection that elevates form over
substance in the protection of minority rights. As we shall see, the
27. See, e.g., G.EDWARD WHITE,THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION:PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 107 (3d ed. 2007) (deeming Harlan a “visionary prophet” for his Plessy
dissent); Derek Bok, A Call for Pressure on Apartheid, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1985, at A21
(praising Harlan’s dissent for reflecting “ideals central to our national creed”); Daniel Farber
& Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 267 (1996) (valorizing
Harlan’s dissent as “justly lauded”); cf. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and
the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 151, 168 (1996) (noting “the symbolic power of
Harlan’s rejection of segregation of African Americans and whites in New Orleans streetcars
is rivaled only by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.’s I Have a Dream speech and Brown
v. Board of Education itself,” but critiquing the decision by society and the academy “to offer
a sanitized version of Harlan’s point of view,” which included, among other things, deep
animus against the Chinese).
28. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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proto-tolerance exhibited by Harlan’s dissent found a voice in much
of the seemingly progressive jurisprudence of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, and it continues to resonate in the
colorblindness jurisprudence of the modern era.
A. The Unbearable Lightness of Dissenting: The Limits of 
Equality in Harlan’s Interrogation of Segregation
With his famous dissent, Harlan became the sole Justice to
oppose the Supreme Court’s otherwise unanimous adoption of the
infamous “separate but equal” doctrine, which upheld the constitu-
tionality of racial segregation.32 As Harlan maintained, the doctrine
was “hostile to both the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the
United States” and ran afoul of the guarantee of equal protection
under the law by facially distinguishing between White and Black
people in the facilities to which they had access.33 In language
admittedly progressive for 1896, he opined,
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.34
Ultimately, therefore, Harlan called for the elimination of de jure
racial discrimination against African Americans. With prescient
language, he warned that “the judgment this day rendered will, in
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this
tribunal in the Dred Scott case.”35
Yet for all its merit, Harlan’s dissent advanced only a deeply
restrained notion of equality before the law that ultimately fueled
a philosophical approach to equal protection that served regressive
impulses bent on preserving White rule. Most overtly, Harlan’s
dissent carefully eschewed any endorsement of racial equality; in
32. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552, 558-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 563.
34. Id. at 559.
35. Id.
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fact, it expressly reaffirmed the notion of White supremacy.36 In
striking language that was wholly unnecessary to deciding the legal
issue at hand, he took pains to insist that the White race was still
superior “in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and
in power,” and he issued a resounding prediction that this domi-
nance would “continue ... for all time.”37 And after all of his high-
minded language about equality before the law “without regard to
race,” he had no trouble condemning Chinese people as excludable
from the country because they are “a race so different from our
own,” that is, the White race.38 When viewed in conjunction with
this active embrace of racial hierarchy, Harlan’s constitutional
rebuke of segregation constitutes a genteel spin on White suprem-
acy that reads the Constitution as an instrument of noblesse oblige
intended to provide a minimal semblance of protection—but nothing
more—to racial minorities accursed with (apparently immutable
and inherent) inferiority in all other aspects of life.
Of course, one might attempt to ascribe Harlan’s rhetoric to
strategic messaging—an attempt to sell his (radical, for its time)
proposition of political equality to his White audience while as-
suaging its concerns that such a turn would necessarily dictate
economic and social equality for Black people and others.39 But there
is good reason to take Harlan’s comments at face value, particularly
given the thrust of his other jurisprudence, which resoundingly
dispelled any illusion that he was a fervent advocate for racial
justice. For example, in Chae Chan Ping, Harlan joined a unani-
mous Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality of the
Chinese Exclusion Act—the federal government’s wholesale pro-
hibition of Chinese immigration to the United States.40 In the case,
he agreed that Congress possessed the unilateral power to exclude
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 560-61.
39. In other words, Harlan’s assurances of White superiority could be interpreted as an
early example of heading off what we now call “White Fragility.” See Robin DiAngelo, White
Fragility, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 54 (2011) (“White Fragility is a state in which
even a minimum amount of racial stress becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive
moves. These moves include the outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt,
and behaviors such as argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing situation.
These behaviors, in turn, function to reinstate white racial equilibrium.”).
40. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
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“foreigners of a different race” from our country.41 He also supported
the federal government’s explicit use of color-based distinctions in
citizenship determinations in Wong Kim Ark.42 And, just three years
after Plessy, he had no compunction about refusing to stop an all-
White school board in Georgia from closing, under the guise of fiscal
economy, a county’s only publicly supported high school for Black
children in Cumming.43
B. White Paternalism, First-Order Equal Protection, and Harlan’s
Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence: Reconciling the Plessy
Dissent with Chae Chan Ping, Wong Kim Ark, and Cumming
At first blush, reconciling Harlan’s opinions in other equal
protection cases with his dissent in Plessy presents a grave
challenge—until one considers that it was not racial inequity to
which Harlan objected. In fact, Harlan’s seemingly progressive
dissent in Plessy was entirely consonant with his tolerance of
government discrimination elsewhere. In this sense, Chae Chan
Ping, Wong Kim Ark, and Cumming powerfully illustrate the
consequences and limitations of Harlan’s Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence and first-order notions of equal protection.
As Molly Townes O’Brien has argued, Harlan possessed a
worldview “steeped in white paternalism and Republican federal-
ism.”44 Harlan’s vision of colorblindness rejected any notion of social
or economic equality for members of non-White races45 and viewed
the Fourteenth Amendment as applying the requirements of equal
protection only to government action by the states, not the federal
41. Id. at 606.
42. United States v. Wong Kim Ark,169 U.S. 649, 705-32 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., joined by
Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the idea of birthright citizenship and advocating for the
federal government’s use of race-based distinctions in citizenship determinations).
43. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 541-45 (1899).
44. Molly Townes O’Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy
Dissenter’s Color-Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 755 (1998).
45. As Jack Chin argues, Harlan possessed “a literalistic, non-transformative view of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” which conceptualized the Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting
“discrimination against African Americans because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
discrimination against African Americans, not because, say, the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies a general anti-discrimination principle, or because discrimination is, in general,
normatively undesirable.” Chin, supra note 27, at 171-72.
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government.46 Not surprisingly, therefore, Harlan adopted a “race
jurisprudence in which constitutionally cognizable discrimination
could be found only in the language of state law or in intentionally
harmful racist acts.”47 So while Harlan looked askance at overt
facial discrimination at the state level, he often blessed it elsewhere.
For example, he did not hesitate to permit the race-based discrimi-
nation by the federal government at the heart of both Chae Chan
Ping48 and Wong Kim Ark.49
Moreover, Harlan’s view of equal protection—even as applied to
the states—was exceedingly formalistic and limited to only the most
obvious forms of facial discrimination. While the “conventional view”
of Cumming reads the case as showing that “Harlan eventually
renounced color blindness,”50 an exegesis of his opinion suggests
that it was very much the product of, rather than in opposition to,
Harlan’s view of colorblindness, which myopically immunized all but
the most facially discriminatory action from equal protection scru-
tiny. In other words, Harlan’s fetishization of rigid colorblindness51
meant that, as long as a given policy was formally colorblind (for
example, shutting down the only public high school for Black
students in the county on fiscal grounds in Cumming),52 it survived
Harlan’s circumscribed form of constitutional scrutiny. Harlan’s
embrace of colorblindness, therefore, gave rise to an enervated,
46. See O’Brien, supra note 44, at 763-64.
47. Id. at 755.
48. 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign
powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away
or restrained on behalf of any one.”).
49. 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) (“[T]he presence within our territory of large numbers of
Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining strangers in the land, residing
apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own country,
unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people,
might endanger good order, and be injurious to the public interests.” (quoting Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 717 (1893))).
50. James Lindgren, Seeing Colors, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1059, 1071 (1993) (reviewing
ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)); see also Alexander M. Bickel &
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 1910-21, in THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 759 (Paul
A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984).
51. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
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paternalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that
reaffirmed and advanced the cause of White supremacy.
As a preliminary matter, Harlan’s contention that the Constitu-
tion demanded fealty to an unpliable notion of colorblindness is
curious from both a textualist and originalist point of view. First,
there is nothing explicit in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
that, per se, outlaws government consideration of race.53 Indeed, the
language simply reads, “No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”54 The Equal Pro-
tection Clause consequently lacks any manifest edict calling for
fealty to a notion of colorblindness. Meanwhile, a rigidly colorblind
interpretation of equal protection is likely at odds with the original
meaning and intent of the Framers. Notably, the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not view the Equal Protection Clause
as an outright ban on race consciousness by the government.55 As
Melissa Saunders has observed, the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which
ultimately passed the Fourteenth Amendment, rejected several
draft versions of the Amendment that expressly forbade distinctions
or discrimination on the basis of race.56 Instead, the Framers ulti-
mately adopted a Fourteenth Amendment that made no mention of
racial categorizations, race consciousness, or even the concept of
race.57 Consequently, argues Saunders, “the strong inference is that
[the Framers] intended the clause to aim at some evil other than the
bare consideration of race.”58
53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
54. Id. § 1.
55. For example, the Framers of the Amendment saw no inconsistency between the Equal
Protection Clause and miscegenation laws that accounted for race, because the laws, in their
(misguided) view, applied equally to all races. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection,
Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH.L.REV. 245, 274-75 (1997) (referencing state-
ments by various senators); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 321-22 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Lyman Trumbull); id. at 505 (statement of Sen. William P. Fessenden); id. at 632
(statement of Rep. Samuel W. Moulton).
56. Saunders, supra note 55, at 275-76. As Saunders concludes, “The Joint Committee’s
consistent rejection of proposals explicitly forbidding racial distinctions and racial
discrimination—even in access to basic civil rights—casts considerable doubt on the assertion
that the framers intended the language of the Equal Protection Clause to strike at all race-
based or race-conscious state action.” Id. at 280.
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
58. Saunders, supra note 55, at 280-81.
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Moreover, the very same Congress passed numerous laws that
expressly accounted for race, typically in the course of providing
particular benefits for African Americans.59 If colorblindness were
the law of the land, as enshrined by the Fourteenth Amendment, it
would make no sense for the very drafters thereof to pass such laws
as the Freedmen’s Bureau Act,60 the Southern Homestead Act,61 and
the Sundry Civil Expenses Appropriations Act of 1866.62
More pointedly, while rigid adherence to colorblindness might
“root out color-conscious legal standards and identifiable acts of
intentional discrimination,” elevation of the concept to primacy in
the process of constitutional scrutiny enables courts to “ignore[ ] the
pervasively discriminatory reality faced by black plaintiffs and ...
fail[ ] to provide a remedy for racial injustice.”63 Instead of mandat-
ing government blindness to race, equal treatment under the law
may well require government consideration of, and accounting for,
racial disparities and discrimination in order to foster equal op-
portunity. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s Cumming decision provides
a particularly compelling example of the foibles of colorblindness
and the role of the doctrine in assisting the reassertion of White
59. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of The Hispanic National Bar Ass’n & the Hispanic Ass’n
of Colleges and Universities in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Amici Curiae] (“[T]he same Congress that proposed the Four-
teenth Amendment also enacted race-conscious legislation.”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 431 (1997) (noting that numerous pieces of legislation from the
same congressional period as the Fourteenth Amendment “expressly refer to color in the
allotment of federal benefits”).
60. See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (repealed 1872) (seeking to
provide practical assistance, including food; housing; and medical, educational, and legal aid
to newly freed African Americans); see also Amici Curiae, supra note 59, at 10 (“Since the
drafters of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment supported the
Freedmen’s Bureau legislation, it follows that the equal protection language of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to eliminate the racial restrictions within the Freedmen’s Acts.
If the Fourteenth Amendment had eliminated the racial limitations, it would have eliminated
the Bureau as well. Moreover, some of the race-specific functions of the Bureau were extended
by statute after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative
Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 785
(1985) (“No member of Congress hinted at any inconsistency between the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.”).
61. Southern Homestead Act of 1866, ch. 127, 14 Stat. 66 (repealed 1876) (granting
priority to freed African Americans over White people in certain southern states).
62. Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 295, 296, 14 Stat. 310, 317 (appropriating funds specifically
“for the relief of destitute colored women and children”).
63. O’Brien, supra note 44, at 756.
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hegemony in post-Reconstruction America.64 In Cumming, a unan-
imous decision penned by Justice Harlan just three years after
Plessy, the lone Plessy dissenter adopted a limited view of equal pro-
tection that effectively sanctioned school segregation and, in the
process, ensured the perpetuation of racial inequities.65
1. Colorblindness and White Supremacy: The Curious Case of
Cumming
In 1897, three African Americans—Joseph W. Cumming, James
S. Harper, and John C. Ladeveze—filed suit to challenge a decision
by the Richmond County Board of Education to close Ware High
School, a secondary school in Augusta, Georgia, established in 1880
to educate African American teenagers.66 The Board cited economic
reasons, not any discriminatory motivation, for its decision; but, as
even the Court admitted, the Board’s decision effectively “withdrew
from and denied to the colored school population any participation
in the educational facilities of a high school system in the county.”67
In short, while the county’s White high schools remained opera-
tional, the Board had chosen to close the only African American
high school.68
Nevertheless, Harlan, writing for the Court, rejected the claim
that the Board’s actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
saw no reason to question the Board’s putative rationale: that the
move was necessary to preserve the Board’s commitment to ele-
mentary school education for African American children.69 In the
process, the Court adopted the Board’s false dichotomy regarding
the allocation of resources—a posture that claimed preservation of
the elementary educational program for African Americans neces-
sarily required cessation of the Board’s secondary educational pro-
gram for them.70 The illogic of this narrative is readily apparent.
64. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 542-45 (1899).
65. See id. at 545.
66. Id. at 529-32; C. Ellen Connally, Justice Harlan’s “Great Betrayal”? A Reconsideration
of Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 72, 72 (2000).
67. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 530.
68. See id. at 532.
69. Id. at 544-45.
70. The Board argued that 
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After all, if the county could fund both elementary and high school
education for White students, there is no reason (other than the
obvious fact of racial animus) why it could not provide both ele-
mentary and high school education for African American students.
If funding limits did not present a Hobson’s choice for White edu-
cation, they should not have presented one for African American
education.71 Meanwhile, the Court did not even bother to question
the very requirement of having different facilities for Black and
White children72 or to scrutinize the vast disparity in funding made
available for Black versus White educational institutions.73
[b]ecause four hundred or more of negro children were being turned away from
the primary grades unable to be provided with seats or teachers; because the
same means and the same building which were used to teach sixty high school
pupils would accommodate two hundred pupils in the rudiments of education ...
it would be unwise and unconscionable to keep up a high school for sixty pupils
and turn away three hundred little negroes who are asking to be taught their
alphabet and to read and write.
Id. at 532-33. The Court agreed, noting that
[t]he Board had before it the question whether it should maintain, under its
control, a high school for about sixty colored children or withhold the benefits of
education in primary schools from three hundred children of the same race. It
was impossible, the Board believed, to give educational facilities to the three
hundred colored children who were unprovided for, if it maintained a separate
school for the sixty children who wished to have a high school education. Its
decision was in the interest of the greater number of colored children.
Id. at 544.
71. As the Court disingenuously suggested, “The colored school children of the county
would not be advanced in the matter of their education by a decree compelling the defendant
Board to cease giving support to a high school for white children.” Id.
72. But see Connally, supra note 66, at 72-73 (pointing out that the issue of the
constitutionality of school segregation was not before the Court in Cumming). Admittedly, the
Court claimed that
[i]t was said at the argument that the vice in the common school system of
Georgia was the requirement that the white and colored children of the State be
educated in separate schools. But we need not consider that question in this
case. No such issue was made in the pleadings.
Cumming, 175 U.S. at 543. Yet the Court did acknowledge that the complaint in the suit at
hand alleged that
plaintiffs, being taxpayers, are debarred the privilege of sending their children
to a high school which is not a free school, but one where tuition is charged, and
that a portion of the school fund, raised by taxation, is appropriated to sustain
white high schools to which negroes are not admitted.
Id. at 542. By implicating the separation of White and Black people, this allegation would
seemingly be sufficient to give a willing court the ability to address the legality of educational
segregation.
73. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 542 (“[A] portion of the [Board’s] school fund, raised by
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Although some observers have interpreted Harlan’s decision in
Cumming as an abandonment of the high-minded principles
asserted in his Plessy dissent,74 there is good reason to question that
view. After all, both decisions reflected a consistent commitment to,
and myopic concern with, colorblindness. Since Harlan could find no
explicit evidence in Cumming that the Board had acted with an
intent to harm Black children (that is, acted in a manner that was
not colorblind), the Board’s decision could not offend his carefully
circumscribed notion of equal protection, which fetishized formal
colorblindness.75 In the process, however, Harlan’s colorblindness
played an instrumental role in rationalizing governmental efforts to
actively suppress educational and economic opportunities for Afri-
can Americans. As O’Brien argues, Harlan’s decision in Cumming
“made a ‘color-blind’ decision that dealt a serious blow to black ef-
forts to require white school boards to provide equal educational
facilities for black children.”76
Indeed, Cumming actively embraced a vision of African American
education that served White needs by ensuring a competent labor
market for White owners of property and capital while limiting
African American economic mobility. Because equal educational
opportunities were not required by the Fourteenth Amendment, “the
Court gave weight to the economic system where White decision
makers could control the labor market by giving Blacks only the
education they needed for work in the agri-economy controlled by
Whites.”77 As a result, Harlan’s assertion of White supremacy, which
immediately precedes his embrace of colorblindness in the Plessy
dissent,78 is not as incongruous as it first appears; Harlan’s genteel
notion of White supremacy was reflected in his commitment to rigid
colorblindness. Colorblindness allowed him to plausibly claim fealty
to the purported values of our Constitution and the vague idea of
taxation, is appropriated to sustain white high schools to which negroes are not admitted.”).
But see id. at 543 (“While the Board appropriates some money to assist a denominational
school for white boys and girls, it has never established a high school for white boys.”).
74. See O’Brien, supra note 44, at 755.
75. See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544-45.
76. O’Brien, supra note 44, at 756.
77. Anita F. Hill, A History of Hollow Promises: How Choice Jurisprudence Fails to
Achieve Educational Equality, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 115 (2006).
78. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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racial equality before the law (but nowhere else) while still pro-
moting an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that was
tolerant of, and even participated in, the maintenance of deep racial
divides.
2. The Historicization of Racism and the Legacy of
Colorblindness: The Enfeeblement of 
Equal Protection into the Modern Era
Thus, while Harlan’s Plessy dissent gave an important jurispru-
dential voice to the integration movement, which ultimately pre-
vailed with Brown,79 it contained another lasting legacy with more
problematic consequences: the notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment demands strict colorblindness. As this concept’s revival in the
latter part of the twentieth century has illustrated, the trope of
colorblindness has long served as a powerful tool in severely lim-
iting the ability of the government to counter and undo longstanding
inequalities that fall along racial lines (inequalities that the
government itself played an instrumental role in creating).80
Specifically, Harlan’s concept of the colorblind Constitution has
enjoyed remarkable resonance in modern political and legal rhetoric
and found its most salient expression in the affirmative action juris-
prudence of the past two decades—an area of remedial, rather than
invidious, race consciousness.81 Critics of remedial, race-conscious
policies in education and employment have seized upon the moral
heft and elegant simplicity of Harlan’s words to paint such pro-
grams as outmoded and regressive by unnecessarily preserving
racial differentiation in an otherwise (purportedly) post-racial
society.82
79. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
80. Cf. HELEN A. NEVILLE, MIGUEL E. GALLARDO & DERALD WING SUE, THE MYTH OF
RACIAL COLORBLINDNESS (2016) (collecting essays from psychology, sociology, and education
scholars that challenge the concept of colorblind racial ideology; argue that interpersonal and
institutional racism still exists; and advocate for the use of race-conscious policies and prac-
tices, rather than color-blind racial beliefs, to promote equal access and opportunities for all).
81. See infra notes 162-64, 193 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730
n.14, 747-48 (2007) (quoting the colorblindness language in Harlan’s Plessy dissent and
tautologically asserting that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race,” and, in the process, striking as unconstitutional the use
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The intuitive appeal of such arguments—with their ability to
create a bright-line rule on racial consideration by the govern-
ment—is certainly understandable. But, in both Harlan’s nine-
teenth-century instantiation and its more modern guise, a partic-
ularly revisionist narrative about race has undergirded the trope of
colorblindness: that, although racism was an unfortunate and
regrettable part of our past, its existence and impact has been extin-
guished in the present.83 This historicization of racism has, there-
fore, played a central role in rationalizing a constitutional mandate
for colorblindness. For example, just twenty years after the end of
slavery, the Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of
1875 as unconstitutional.84 In so doing, the Court criticized the leg-
islation on colorblindness grounds,85 castigating its supporters for
of race as an admission tiebreaker for the purpose of promoting diversity in secondary
schools); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (dissenting from the majority’s allowance of the limited use of race to
promote classroom diversity in admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law School
by quoting Harlan’s dissent in Plessy and asserting that such policies violate the absolute
mandate for government colorblindness); id. at 346-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (positing that “[t]he Constitution proscribes government discrimination
on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception” and that, therefore, race-
conscious admissions policies at state educational institutions are unconstitutional); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (applying strict scrutiny to the use of a subcontracting incentive
bonus implemented by the federal government to assist businesses owned by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, including those from minority groups, to win contract
bids, and arguing that “under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions
on the basis of race”); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that “government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the
basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction” and
that, therefore, the policy at issue should be rejected out of hand rather than remanded to the
district court for the application of strict scrutiny, as “under our Constitution there can be no
such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.... In the eyes of government, we are just one
race here. It is American.” (quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989))).
83. See Helen A.Neville, Miguel E. Gallardo & Derald Wing Sue, Introduction: Has the
United States Really Moved Beyond Race? in THE MYTH OF RACIAL COLORBLINDNESS, supra
note 80, at 9-10.
84. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
85. It is worth acknowledging that Harlan filed a dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases in which he criticized the majority for viewing the legislation as creating “special
favorite[s]” of African Americans. Id. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). As he wrote,
It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special
favorite of the laws. The statute of 1875, now adjudged to be unconstitutional,
is for the benefit of citizens of every race and color. What the nation, through
Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race, is—what had
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advancing a law that made “special favorite[s]” of African Ameri-
cans:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of benefi-
cent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of
that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his eleva-
tion when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen,
or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which
other men’s rights are protected.86
Thus, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Court had no issue
brushing aside the powerful persistence of bigotry and gainsaying
the continued existence of vast divisions on the basis of race.
Instead, it claimed with a straight face that, far from being neces-
sary to protect the basic rights of African Americans, basic civil
rights legislation protecting members of all races from discrimina-
tion served to grant African Americans unequal privileges.87
In more recent times, even jurists who have supported the sur-
vival of affirmative action have signaled reservations over its
inconsistency with the ideals of colorblindness and their vision of
the new reality of race relations in our country. Writing on behalf of
the Court’s majority in Grutter v. Bollinger, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor declared, with unusual certainty, that “[w]e expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”88 While O’Connor
already been done in every State of the Union for the white race—to secure and
protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more.
Id. Even here, however, Harlan argued that the Act itself was colorblind (it literally made no
reference to any particular race, after all) and therefore passed constitutional muster. Id. at
61-62.
86. Id. at 25. The “special favorites” rhetoric has also found its way into discourse
surrounding gay rights, as evidenced by its adoption by supporters of Colorado’s Amendment
2, which was struck down as unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In that
case, Colorado argued that Amendment 2—which precluded any state or local government
action from protecting the status of persons based on their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships”—merely blocked gay people from enjoying
“special rights” from the state. Id. at 624, 626. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that it
actually imposed a special legal disability by preventing these individuals from seeking
certain legal safeguards “without constraint.” Id. at 631.
87. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
88. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
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understandably hoped that, in an ideal world, “all governmental use
of race must have a logical end point,”89 her edict reflected several
problematic suppositions.90 Besides the arbitrariness of the time
limit, there was little basis for the unwarranted optimism that
centuries of pervasive institutional racism could be undone with a
few decades of carefully circumscribed government intervention of
dubious efficacy.91 Notably, O’Connor’s declaration assumes that,
while the government may need to undertake remedial race-based
policies in limited forms to attack the vestiges of past discrimina-
tion, racism does not exist in the present and is unlikely to spur
further inequities in the future.
Whether used intentionally or not, the colorblindness trope has
effectively defanged courts on racial matters, preventing them from
combatting all but the most overtly invidious racist policies and
constricting their ability to sustain most forms of remedial legis-
lation. By limiting the scope of governmental actions subject to
meaningful equal protection scrutiny, Harlan’s embrace of rigid col-
orblindness immunized political processes, such as the Richmond
County School Board’s “fiscal” decision,92 from judicial interference
and allowed them unrestrained power to exacerbate racial inequali-
ties and reassert White hegemony. All the while, as it turns out, his
89. Id. at 342.
90. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 171, 172 (2004) (“At first blush, the Court’s pronouncement seemed overly
optimistic, if not woefully out of place in a judicial opinion.”).
91. See, e.g, Dan Slater, Opinion, Does Affirmative Action Do What It Should?, N.Y.TIMES
(Mar. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/opinion/sunday/does-affirmative-action-
do-what-it-should.html [https://perma.cc/QGV9-6F59] (discussing the scholarship of “mis-
match theory,” which argues that “affirmative action can harm those it’s supposed to help by
placing them at schools in which they fall below the median level of ability and therefore have
a tough time,” ultimately hurting them in the long term); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Affirmative
Action Fail: The Achievement Gap by Income Is Twice the Gap by Race, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr.
27, 2014), https://www.newrepublic.com/article/117529/affirmative-action-fail-achievement-
gap-income-twice-gap-r [https://perma.cc/A2BS-DVWW] (considering the value of replacing
affirmative action by race with affirmative action based on income); Tanner Colby, Affirmative
Action: It’s Time for Liberals to Admit It Isn’t Working, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2014, 11:52 PM),
https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/02/affirmative-action-its-time-for-liberals-to-admit-it-
isnt-working.html [https://perma.cc/FH3F-EGR8] (critiquing the failure of affirmative action
and positing that, inter alia, “[a]ffirmative action[’s] ... net result was to absorb and neutralize
black demands for equality, not fulfill them”).
92. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899); see supra Part
I.B.1.
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jurisprudence of colorblindness worked in harmony with other
purportedly progressive moments in late nineteenth-century juris-
prudence, such as Strauder,93 to construct a post-Reconstruction
society that paid limited lip service to a (constricted) notion of
equality while, in fact, giving rise to legal mechanisms that per-
petuated the existence of sharp social, political, and economic di-
vides among the races.
C. Establishing the Legal Machinery of White Hegemony: The
Limited Progressivism of Strauder
1. Facial Neutrality and White Hegemony
Even in the rare instance of a victory for racial justice, nine-
teenth-century courts still unabashedly invoked the language of
hierarchy and, ultimately, reaffirmed and advanced the cause of
White supremacy. In Strauder, a case that Sanford Levinson has
lauded as the most important (and underappreciated) in the equal
protection canon,94 the Supreme Court held that denying a defen-
dant a jury that might contain members of his or her own race con-
stituted a deprivation of equal protection and due process rights.95
The result was unusual for the era: the Court reversed the murder
conviction96 of an African American man named Taylor Strauder in
Ohio County, West Virginia, because the jury that decided his case
93. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
94. Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia Is the Most Important Single Source
of Insight on the Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 603, 603 (2018).
95. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-10.
96. The undisputed facts showed that Strauder had murdered his wife, Anna, an African
American, by bludgeoning her to death with a hatchet after an argument involving allegations
of her marital infidelity. State v. Strauder, 11 W. Va. 745, 756 (1877), rev’d sub nom. Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see also Horrible Murder. A Colored Woman
Tomahawked by Her Husband. He Brains Her with a Hatchet. The Murderer Escapes.,
WHEELING DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 19, 1872), https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/data/
batches/wvu_belgium_ver01/data/sn84026844/0020219087A/1872041901/0382.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EK8-8C8D]. A century later, the Court would grapple with empirical
evidence showing that African American defendants were far more likely to receive the death
penalty if their victim was White rather than African American. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987). As such, it is fair to wonder if the Court would have come to the same
conclusion about the exclusion of members of the defendant’s own race from the jury if
Strauder’s victim had been White rather than Black.
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was, by state law, drawn exclusively from a pool of White men over
the age of twenty-one.97
Besides its outcome, there is much to celebrate about the Strau-
der decision, particularly its rationale that legal exclusion from jury
pools placed a badge of inferiority on Black people. With remarkable
clarity, Justice Strong’s majority opinion held that
[t]he very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration
of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are
citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practi-
cally a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others.98
In the process, the Court recognized, for perhaps the first time, the
active role of the state and its legal regime in accentuating the very
prejudices that courts had long blamed on society and about which
more laissez-faire courts would, for many years, claim they could
do nothing.99 Thus, as Rachel Godsil argues, Strauder “defined
discrimination to include protection from certain messages sent by
a state’s legislation.”100 This significant move would lay critical
groundwork for later developments, including Brown’s emphasis
on the psychological damage that classroom segregation caused
African American students101 and Obergefell’s recognition of the
97. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305, 308-09, 312.
98. Id. at 308.
99. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (“If the two races are to meet
upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation
of each other’s merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.... Legislation is powerless to
eradicate racial instincts.... If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”).
100. Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U.MICH.J.L.REFORM 247,
256 (2003); see also Levinson, supra note 94, at 617 (noting that Justice Strong’s opinion
recognizes an “awareness by white jurors that blacks were thought unworthy to serve on
juries at all might have spillover consequences for their perception of Taylor Strauder and
other African-American defendants who challenge the State’s account of their conduct”).
101. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate them from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.”).
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dignitary harm that failure to recognize same-sex marriage inflict-
ed on such couples and their children.102
Yet for all of its theoretical broad-mindedness, Strauder comes up
short in practice. To be sure, Strauder gave considerable attention
to the role that governmental actions can have in either affirming
or undermining social perceptions and prejudices.103 But the deci-
sion ultimately took a narrow view of the government’s responsibil-
ity (particularly under the Fourteenth Amendment) in supporting
the cause of racial equality.104 While Strauder forbade the express
use of racial requirements for jury service, it had no problem
allowing any number of other conditions with strong racial valences,
such as educational attainment.105 Use of such limitations would
effectively ensure the preservation of the all-White jury system.106
Lest one criticize such a reading as too ungenerous, such a result
was not just implied by Strauder but, rather, explicitly suggested by
it. Less than a generation removed from laws that criminalized
African American literacy in many states,107 the Court heartily
approved of the use of facially “neutral” criteria that would effec-
tively continue to prevent African Americans from serving on juries
or exercising other civil and political rights.108 Thus, Strauder
elevated the government’s words over the ultimate impact of its
actions—a fatal flaw when one considers the systemic inequalities
created by centuries of racial discrimination and educational
disparities.
This failure to consider the impact of state policies came home to
roost in the direct aftermath of Strauder with the reassertion of
102. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666-69 (2015).
103. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
104. See id. at 310.
105. See id.
106. Cf. Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE 24-25 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-
discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J35-8M5H] (explaining how formal
educational achievement, among other factors, can be used to discriminate against African
American jurists and yet still survive Batson challenges in some states).
107. See Uzonna Anele, Anti-literacy Laws in the United States Once Prevented Blacks from
Getting an Education, LISTWAND (Feb. 7, 2020), https://listwand.com/anti-literacy-laws-in-the-
united-states-once-prevented-black-men-from-getting-an-education/ [https://perma.cc/QQ5N-
YENC] (explaining that national attention was drawn to anti-literacy laws in 1854, with
Virginia’s being abolished in 1867).
108. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
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White hegemony following Reconstruction. Strauder therefore loses
much of its egalitarian gravitas because it virtually wrote the
playbook for how future efforts at discrimination against African
Americans could easily survive constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, in
the century that followed Strauder, African Americans were still
systematically excluded from juries in many parts of the country.109
As Sanford Levinson points out, this result was not in spite of
Strauder; it may well have been because of Strauder.110
Although the decision found that direct racial prohibitions against
jury service violated the Equal Protection Clause, it stated that
other, ostensibly neutral, prohibitions would not raise such con-
cerns.111 As the Court explained, while the
State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in so
doing make discriminations[,] ... [i]t may confine the selection to
males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages,
or to persons having educational qualifications. We do not be-
lieve the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit
this.112
These words are remarkable because of what they suggest was
permissible in terms of governmental restrictions on jury service
(and, presumably, other benefits of citizenship): criteria, such as
educational attainment, that did not nakedly rely on race.113 In the
process, the Strauder opinion virtually gifted the idea of grandfather
clauses, literacy tests, and other disingenuous vehicles of minority
vote suppression as means to reimpose all-White rule while evading
the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment (even as the Amend-
ment had been interpreted by ostensibly progressive decisions, such
as Strauder).
Thus, Strauder gave constitutional blessing to a series of dis-
enfranchisement mechanisms that would dominate the racial
politics of the next century. While one might conclude that such a
109. Levinson, supra note 94, at 621.
110. Levinson states that “the opinion, intentionally or not, almost invited states to rely
on other criteria that might well have a disparate impact on African Americans.” Id.
111. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
112. Id. This aspect of the Strauder decision would endure for almost a century. See infra
notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
113. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
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result was an unwitting development that the Strauder Court could
not have reasonably foreseen, it seems unlikely when one considers
the context of the decision. After all, only paragraphs before he
announced that tests based on educational attainment would not
implicate race or the Equal Protection Clause (unlike an outright
ban against African Americans serving on a jury), Justice Strong
bemoaned the systemic educational deprivation endured by African
Americans that limited their opportunities in society.114 In authoriz-
ing the use of educational tests to restrict jury service (or other priv-
ileges of citizenship, such as voting), the Court knew or should have
known that such policies would effectively serve as race bans, at
least for the foreseeable future.
The disenfranchisement mechanisms condoned by Strauder would
remain viable well into the years of the Warren Court. In 1959, the
Supreme Court upheld literacy tests as constitutional, despite a
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.115 Similarly, in 1965,
the Warren Court affirmed the use of preemptory challenges—
discriminatory consequences be damned—so long as they were not
overtly race-based.116 Indeed, it was not until 1975 with Taylor v.
Louisiana that Strauder’s dictum on the right of the state to
“confine” jury duty “to males” was expressly abrogated.117 Thus, for
all of its rhetorical good, Strauder provided a veritable template to
allow policies with alarmingly discriminatory impacts to evade
Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.118 In the process, Strauder
elevated form over substance; it acknowledged that the Constitution
may have secured an entitlement to a jury system that did not
114. See id. at 306 (noting “[t]heir training had left them mere children”).
115. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
116. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965).
117. 419 U.S. 522, 533, 536 n.19 (1975) (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310) (holding that
uniform exclusion of women from jury venires deprives defendants of their Sixth Amendment
right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of their community).
118. It is worth noting that the intent/animus requirement of Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 244-46 (1976), continues to protect such policies from constitutional scrutiny to this
very day, albeit in a softened form. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287, 297-99
(1987) (rejecting an African American death-row inmate’s equal protection to imposition of
the death penalty in Georgia, despite statistical evidence of its disparate administration on
the basis of race (for example, a defendant who killed a White victim was over four times more
likely to receive the death penalty than a defendant who killed a Black victim), because the
disparate treatment could not be directly traced to actual animus or discriminatory intent by
lawmakers and those implementing the penalty). 
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overtly deny African Americans the ability to serve on juries, but it
failed to recognize a right for defendants to enjoy an actual jury of
their representative racial peers or a constitutional mandate that
required the jury system to actually allow African Americans to
serve.
All the while, just as with Harlan’s venerated dissent in Plessy,119
the Strauder majority opinion expressly embraced and reaffirmed
White supremacy.120 In the course of its analysis, the Strauder
Court did not hesitate to refer to African Americans of the time as
“abject and ignorant, and in that condition ... unfit[ ] to command
the respect of those who had superior intelligence.”121 Although the
Court at least partly seemed to attribute its characterization of the
African American condition to the denial of education to Black
people, which had “left them mere children,” its reference to the
“superior intelligence” of White people suggests the existence of a
purportedly innate advantage that no amount of education might
overcome.122
Lest there be any remaining doubt as to the Court’s view or the
mutability of this situation, the Court also overtly deemed White
people to be “the superior race.”123 With a heavy miasma of noblesse
oblige and an air of condescension, the Court then intoned that it is
the task of “a wise government ... [to] extend[ ] [protection] to those
who are unable to protect themselves.”124 Not surprisingly, such
paternalistic ideations prevented the Court from embracing a more
capacious notion of equal protection that interdicted more than just
the most brazen forms of race discrimination.
2. Not All Rights Are Created Equal: The False Dichotomy
Between Civil Rights and Other Rights
Finally, Strauder failed to condemn government support for race
discrimination in a broad sense. As a result, it did not even serve as
a speed bump on the road to Plessy’s constitutional sanctioning of
119. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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segregation. By failing to tackle the distinction between the pro-
tection of civil rights and other types of rights that the Court would
frequently invoke over the coming decades as a justification for
limiting the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, Strauder actually
paved the way for Plessy. Specifically, the dissent in Strauder—filed
by Justices Field and Clifford and spelled out in the companion case,
Ex parte Virginia125—drew upon a distinction between equality in
civil rights (to which Field and Clifford claimed the Equal Protection
Clause pertained) and equality in other matters (which they
believed lay beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment).126 To
Field and Clifford, equality in civil rights merely required equal
access to courts to secure person and property; they assumed that
jury service was a different kind of right (one they billed “political”)
as it involved “participat[ion] in the government of the State and the
administration of its laws ... [and] be[ing] clothed with any public
trusts.”127 As they opined,
The equality of the protection secured [under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] extends only to civil
rights as distinguished from those which are political, or arise
from the form of the government and its mode of administra-
tion.... It secures to all persons their civil rights upon the same
terms; but it leaves political rights, or such as arise from the
form of government and its administration, as they stood pre-
vious to [the Fourteenth Amendment’s] adoption.128
125. See id. at 312 (Field, J., dissenting) (“I dissent ... on the grounds stated in my opinion
in Ex parte Virginia.”).
126. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367-68 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 367 (Equality in civil rights “opens the courts of the country to every one, on the
same terms, for the security of his person and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs,
and the enforcement of contracts; it assures to every one the same rules of evidence and
modes of procedure; it allows no impediments to the acquisition of property and the pursuit
of happiness, to which all are not subjected; it suffers no other or greater burdens or charges
to be laid upon one than such as are equally borne by others; and in the administration of
criminal justice it permits no different or greater punishment to be imposed upon one than
such as is prescribed to all for like offences. It secures to all persons their civil rights upon the
same terms.”).
128. Id. at 367-68. To substantiate this view of the Fourteenth Amendment, Field and
Clifford posited that
[n]othing, in my judgment, could have a greater tendency to destroy the
independence and autonomy of the States; reduce them to a humiliating and
degrading dependence upon the central government; engender constant
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For further proof of this notion, Field and Clifford pointed out that,
when political equality was required, as with the elimination of
racial barriers to the franchise, a wholly separate amendment—the
Fifteenth—was required.129
Interestingly, Field and Clifford’s view of so-called political rights
mimics the still-prevailing logic in equal-protection cases involving
alienage. Although the Burger Court long ago held that strict scru-
tiny should generally apply to alienage classifications,130 subsequent
decisions by the Supreme Court have diluted this general principal
through the adoption of a significant exception: classifications in-
volving a matter of “discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of
policy, which substantially affects members of the political commu-
nity.”131 As the courts have rationalized, fundamental interests in
democratic self-governance necessarily must allow for such an
administrative and political exception to equal protection for
alienage because Americans possess the “right ... to be governed by
their citizen peers.”132 Thus, courts have applied only rational basis
review in upholding the rights of states to bar noncitizens from
becoming police officers133 or public school teachers.134 With similar
irritation; and destroy that domestic tranquility which it was one of the objects
of the Constitution to insure,—than the doctrine asserted in this case, that
Congress can exercise coercive authority over judicial officers of the States in the
discharge of their duties under State laws.
Id. at 358. Field and Clifford’s use of the words “humiliating and degrading” to describe the
impact that imposing a Fourteenth Amendment check on the ability of states to restrict jury
service on the basis of race would have is deeply ironic when one considers their lack of
interest in considering how humiliating and degrading such a policy was on actual people (for
example, non-White people) rather than an inanimate object (for example, states).
129. Id. at 368 (“This is manifest from the fact that when it was desired to confer political
power upon the newly made citizens of the States, as was done by inhibiting the denial to
them of the suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, a new
amendment was required.”).
130. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (holding alienage
classifications “inherently suspect” and generally subject to strict scrutiny).
131. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 297, 300 (upholding a New York law requiring police officers in the state to
be American citizens as, among other things, “execution of the broad powers vested in [police
officers] affects members of the public significantly and often in the most sensitive areas of
daily life”).
134. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76, 81 (1979) (upholding a New York law
barring noncitizens from becoming public school instructors on the basis that teaching
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logic, Field and Clifford believed that the right to serve as a juror—
because it necessarily involved the administration of law—was not
a basic matter of civil rights secured for all citizens because it could
(and should) be circumscribed as the polity deemed fit.135
As Sanford Levinson notes, Justice Strong’s majority opinion in
Strauder “fail[ed] to offer any rebuttal at all to Justice Field’s
arguments and instead almost blandly unit[ed] the ‘political right’
of jury service with the ‘civil rights’ that were protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”136 The absence of any effort to address
Field and Clifford’s bifurcated view of rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment is significant because the distinction they promoted
between civil rights on one hand and other types of rights on the
other hand would ultimately prevail in other post-Reconstruction
cases, including Plessy. According to the Plessy Court, “The object of
the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law,” but segregation
was permissible because “in the nature of things it could not have
been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”137 Or as the
Plessy majority succinctly put it later in the decision: “If one race be
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane.”138 Clearly, the Plessy Court
would not acknowledge the vital role that legal frameworks can play
in creating, accentuating, encouraging, and even fomenting in-
equalities of many kinds, including those on racial grounds.
In the end, therefore, Strauder and related cases of the era that
ruled in favor of African American litigants bringing civil-rights
challenges to jury exclusions (including Virginia v. Rives,139 Ex parte
Virginia,140 and Neal v. Delaware141) still ultimately enabled the
constitutes “a task ‘that go[es] to the heart of representative government’” (quoting Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (alteration in original))).
135. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
136. Levinson, supra note 94, at 619.
137. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
138. Id. at 552.
139. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
140. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
141. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
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holding in Plessy. Strauder’s unrebutted dissent legitimated Plessy’s
distinction between the types of equality that the Fourteenth
Amendment did secure and those that it did not.142 And with its
carefully constrained reading of the right to be free from race
discrimination (one that came equipped with a playbook on how to
achieve discriminatory ends whilst averting heightened constitu-
tional scrutiny), Strauder and its purportedly egalitarian progeny
demonstrated that—Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments be
damned—the courts would still tolerate the existence of two classes
of citizenship in post-Reconstruction America. As Peggy Cooper
Davis, Aderson Francois, and Colin Starger have argued, these
cases were characterized by weak justifications.143 Specifically, while
the cases “held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the
exclusion of blacks from jury service,” they did so “because the ex-
clusions constituted racially discriminatory state action that denied
black jurors equal protection of the laws”—not on the grounds that
“jury service is an entitlement of national citizenship.”144
By declining to embrace jury service as a formal entitlement of
national citizenship and occluding recognition of the fundamental
right of defendants to a jury, which is, in practice, picked from a
pool of their (racial) peers, Strauder and its progeny only paid lip
service to eliminating racial barriers to the exercise of the rights of
citizenship. At best, these cases enabled the logic of Plessy and the
triumph of the separate but equal doctrine; at worst, they provided
the blueprint. First, the decisions elevated form over substance by
focusing on whether the conditions for jury service were formally
race neutral rather than inquiring as to whether the conditions for
jury service constituted pretexts to effectuate racial exclusion.
Second, the decisions expressly refused to embrace a broader
reading of rights dictated by citizenship. As a result, this body of
case law allowed the Plessy court to blithely conclude, with a
straight face and a nod to prior jurisprudence, that separate but
equal was constitutionally sound.145 While it might be asking too
142. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 367 (Field, J., dissenting).
143. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Aderson Francois & Colin Starger, The Persistence of the
Confederate Narrative, 84 TENN. L. REV. 301, 319-22 (2017).
144. Id. at 319-20.
145. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (first citing Strauder, 100 U.S. 303;
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much of a nineteenth-century court to do more than this, it is only
fair to characterize the decision as exhibiting proto-tolerance at
best.
D. First-Order Protection and Suspect Categories Beyond Race
The paternalism and subordination reaffirming nature of first-
order equal protection was not just limited to cases involving race.
It also found expression in cases involving other suspect categories,
such as gender.146 For example, although it was not formally an
equal protection case, Muller v. Oregon famously addressed a con-
stitutional challenge to a law expressly distinguishing between
women and men: one that forbade employers from requiring women
(but not men) from working more than ten hours on any given
day.147 Facing a fine of ten dollars for violating the law, Curt Muller,
the owner of a laundry business, contested the punishment all the
way to the Supreme Court.148 Because the suit took place in the
early part of the twentieth century, at a time long before gender was
considered a suspect category amenable to heightened scrutiny,
equal protection did not lie at the heart of the suit.149 Rather, the
gravamen of Muller’s case centered on his allegation that the
statute violated economic substantive due process rights, including
the freedom to contract,150 which, of course, the federal courts had
fetishized during the Lochner era.151 The Court disagreed with
Muller and, in the process, handed a limited victory to the cause of
labor by marking the first major strike against the inviolability of
then citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); then citing Neal, 103 U.S. 370; then citing
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); and then citing Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565
(1896)) (relying on Strauder, Rives, and Neal—among other cases—for the distinction between
civil and other rights).
146. Of course, gender was not recognized as a suspect classification until much later.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
147. 208 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1908).
148. See id. at 417.
149. See id. at 422-23.
150. See id. at 422 (framing the question facing the court as to whether the legislature can
limit the contractual freedoms of a woman in order to protect “her physical structure and a
proper discharge of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own health, but
the well-being of the race—justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the
passion of man”).
151. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
1650 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1615
contracts imposed by Lochner.152 But for all of its significance, the
decision was carefully circumscribed and, in the end, reaffirmed
paternalistic interests of the state in ensuring women continued to
serve the procreative needs of a patriarchal society.153
Josephine Goldmark and Louis Brandeis, who served as head
counsel for the defendant in the case, famously appealed to social
science research on the baleful effects of long hours on the health of
women (and any children they might bear) in a weighty 113-page
brief filed before the Court.154 A strategic gambit to induce the Court
into allowing an exception to the constitutional barriers to the leg-
islation erected by Lochner, the so-called Brandeis Brief premised
its arguments on the purported “‘fact’ of women’s greater physical
frailty.”155 Whether cynical or genuine,156 the maneuver worked, as
the Justices on the Court happily embraced the disquietingly
paternalistic viewpoint of the brief in upholding the legislation.157 In
language deeply steeped in gender stereotypes, the Court famously
posited,
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of mater-
nal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens
of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abun-
dant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long
time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends
to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.158
152. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 423.
153. See id. at 422.
154. See Anne C. Dailey, Lochner for Women, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1217-18 (1996).
155. Id. at 1218.
156. David Bernstein, for example, questions the popular view of Brandeis as a champion
for women’s rights by noting that he “evinced little sympathy for women’s rights in other
contexts ... [and] was a late and unenthusiastic convert to the cause of women’s suffrage....
Brandeis’s reputation as a champion of women’s rights seems more a product of modern views
of what an early twentieth-century Progressive should have stood for than Brandeis’s actual
record on the subject.” David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN BAG 9, 14-15
(2011).
157. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23.
158. Id. at 421.
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In the process, the Court achieved a putatively progressive outcome
while grounding its reasoning in the most condescending terms—
terms that reaffirmed gender-based social hierarchies. The Court
essentialized female existence as the practice of reproduction and
child-rearing.159 All the while, in framing Muller as a limited ex-
ception to Lochner, the Court could not conceive of the fact that
male physical well-being might also be a matter of public interest
and care.160
All told, the progressive victories of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries were limited in ways in which modern
observers often underappreciate. Although these decisions may have
reached a result that ultimately affirmed the rights of the
underclass, the rationale for extending such protections often
derived from paternalistic impulses that ultimately constrained the
impact of such decisions. Steeped in noblesse oblige, these proto-
tolerant cases reaffirmed White male supremacy and protected,
rather than reversed, the existence of multiple classes of citizenship.
And in the end, they also gave rise to doctrines such as
colorblindness that continue to stifle efforts to ameliorate the severe
social, political, and economic inequalities that still haunt our
nation.
II. TOLERANCE, NOT ACCEPTANCE: EQUALITY, SUBORDINATION, AND
SECOND-ORDER PROTECTION IN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
In the second stage of its evolution, equal protection takes on a
more robust meaning. White supremacy is no longer expressly em-
braced, the affirmative right to be free from discrimination begins
to receive recognition, and tolerance is advocated. But second-order
protection has critical limits. Antidiscrimination norms are not
grounded in the inherent dignity and worth of the targeted group.
Instead, invocation of equal protection flows from a certain passive,
laissez-faire sufferance of targeted groups that do no harm, and
rights are instrumentally driven161 and recognized when they might
159. See id.
160. See id. at 421-23.
161. As Bill Eskridge argues, “An instrumentalist justification for tolerance is that it
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serve the interests of those in power. An exegesis of such cases, as
provided below, reflects their detached, conditional calculus of rights
and their consistent failure to celebrate the values and contributions
of the targeted group. In the end, therefore, such second-order cases
ultimately fail to challenge White supremacy and, in many ways,
continue to enable it.
Consider, for example, the conditional tolerance that lies at the
heart of the most recent jurisprudence on affirmative action, in
which the practice remains legal by the thinnest of margins. Since
initially blessing the practice in higher education with its decision
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,162 the Supreme
Court has significantly constrained the rationale for, and limits of,
affirmative action. In Grutter, the Supreme Court suggested that
the sole remaining acceptable rationale for affirmative action rests
on the promotion of diversity in the classroom163—grounds that
primarily benefit a White majority.164 Such instrumentalist notions
enables different people to cooperate productively with one another in an institutional
setting—not just the family, but also the state.” William N. Eskridge Jr., Lawrence’s
Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN.
L. REV. 1021, 1077 (2004).
162. 438 U.S. 265, 272 (1978).
163. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (“In addition to the expert studies and
reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’... These benefits are not
theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.” (citations omitted)).
164. See, e.g., Joshua M. Levine, Comment, Stigma’s Opening: Grutter’s Diversity
Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 94 CALIF.L.REV.
457, 462 (2006) (“The Bakke diversity rationale, with its emphasis on minorities’
‘contribut[ion],’ is about the use of people of color to advance the university’s educational goals
for its (mostly) white students.” (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)); Daria Roithmayr,
Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST.COMMENT. 191, 213 (2004) (“In Grutter,
the compelling government interest that the Court uses to justify race-conscious admissions
preferences is neither remedying past discrimination nor reducing societal discrimination, nor
even benefitting the small numbers of students who are admitted via diversity programs.
Rather, the Court finds a compelling interest in diversifying the classroom for the benefit of
white students.”). As Daria Roithmayhr expounds,
Grutter affirmatively privileges white interests, for three reasons. First, the
diversity rationale itself tends to prioritize white interests, because the rationale
focuses on the value that students of color add to the existing merit-admitted
(and predominantly white) classroom. Second, the Grutter opinion endorses the
kind of “meritocratic” decisionmaking that privileges the admission of white
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also influenced Brown v. Board of Education. As Derrick Bell
famously posited with his interest convergence theory, a majority
race will generally support equality for minorities only when doing
so advances its own interests.165 Bell’s key example in support of his
proposition was the strategic and symbolic value that Brown pro-
vided to the White majority and the United States government in
waging the Cold War.166
In second-order equal-protection jurisprudence, courts either
eschew mention of hierarchy altogether or issue some general
platitudes regarding equality without taking on the fundamental
injustice of subordination practices. So long as such practices
continue in society, however, the absence of any overt discussion
about hierarchy, including the failure to disavow it, constitutes an
effective reaffirmance of it.167 Indeed, the limited intolerance for
race discrimination demonstrated by Harlan’s Plessy dissent
extended to the heralded Brown decision more than a half century
later, when the Supreme Court finally struck down segregation (at
least in public education) as unconstitutional.168 Even in Brown,
which rested largely on the psychological harm that segregation
caused African American students, the Court came up short in its
approach to equality by only embracing a second-order tolerance.169
A. The Denouement of ‘Deliberate Speed’: Brown and Its
Discontents
Brown was, no doubt, a critical victory in the ongoing fight for
civil rights in our country. But it was not without its problems. For
applicants and excludes people of color. Finally, as is made clear by the Court’s
legitimacy rationale, diversity-oriented programs make it easier for institutions
to conceal the discriminatory impact of conventional admissions standards, to
the benefit of white students.
Id. at 211.
165. See Derrick A. Bell, Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 91, 94-96 (Derrick A. Bell ed., 1980).
166. See id. at 96.
167. Cf. Zanita E. Fenton, Disabling Racial Repetition, 31 LAW & INEQ. 77, 83-85 (2012)
(discussing social hierarchies and noting that “the structure of any given hierarchy is invested
in its own affirmation and continuation”).
168. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
169. See id. at 494 & n.11.
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example, although Brown eschewed the language of White suprem-
acy, it notably declined to reject the idea. While one might argue
that White supremacy was not the legal issue at hand in Brown
(and therefore any commentary related to it would be beyond the
proper scope of the opinion), given the context of the decision and
the fact that prior cases upholding segregation were very much
grounded in a legacy (and reaffirmation) of White supremacy,170 it
seems entirely reasonable to expect the Court to address this issue.
After all, White supremacy is relevant to any sober assessment of
American history and race relations.
Admittedly, inclusion of language condemning White supremacy
may have destroyed the valuable ability to make the decision per
curiam and unanimous.171 Yet even if political realities within the
Court did not allow for the express adoption of such a sentiment, it
is notable that the Court did not even go so far as to celebrate the
virtues of tolerance and diversity, and it did not provide any paean
to the contributions of non-White people to American society.172
While it rightfully condemned the badge of inferiority that educa-
tional segregation placed on African Americans (and its subsequent
impact on “educational and mental development”173), it did not take
any time to talk about why such feelings of inferiority were wholly
unwarranted.174
All the while, despite the good this decision accomplished, it took
a devastating toll on a significant constituency in the African
American community: the entire class of African American profes-
sionals who were employed as teachers in segregated schools. While
Black students were integrated in White schools, discrimination still
reigned, and in the newly integrated public schools, White parents
170. See O’Brien, supra note 44, at 755.
171. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Bergin, Authenticating American Democracy, 26 PACE L. REV.
397, 411 (2006) (“The Justices in the majority [for the Court’s initial internal vote on Brown]
understood that even a single dissent could ignite ‘racial warfare’ by injecting a measure of
legitimacy to [the segregationist] cause. To succeed, desegregation required more than
majority support. It required unanimity.” (footnote omitted)).
172. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489-90.
173. Id. at 494.
174. The closest the Court came to affirmatively rebuking the idea of inferiority was its
comment that “many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as
well as in the business and professional world.” Id. at 490.
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would not accept Black teachers instructing their White children.175
Without the option of working at Black-only schools anymore, these
teachers simply lost their jobs en masse. In the decade following
Brown, the number of African American teachers fell by almost 50
percent176 and the number of African American principals in
southern states fell by 90 percent.177 It is not only the Black
professional class that suffered from this state of affairs; it left an
entire generation of African American students entirely without
African American teachers as role models and guides in their
educational development. It is not much of a stretch to conclude that
running “a public school system without [B]lack teachers is [akin]
to teach[ing] [W]hite supremacy without saying a word.”178 Unfortu-
nately, such conditions have continued to plague our educational
system. As of 2000, a stunning 38 percent of public schools in the
United States lacked a single teacher of color.179
One could argue that this particular harm came about from the
Court’s intentionally piecemeal approach to civil rights—as deseg-
regation itself was ordered to be conducted with “all deliberate
speed”180—that focused not on the absolute wrong of discrimination
175. Linda C. Tillman, (Un)Intended Consequences?: The Impact of the Brown v. Board of
Education Decision on the Employment Status of Black Educators, 36 EDUC.&URB.SOC’Y 280,
280-81 (2004) (quoting a March 13, 1953, letter from Wendell Godwin, the superintendent of
public schools in Topeka, Kansas, to an African American elementary school teacher, Darla
Buchanan, nonchalantly informing her, “If the Supreme Court should rule that segregation
in the elementary grades is unconstitutional our Board will proceed on the assumption that
the majority of people in Topeka will not want to employ negro teachers next year for White
children”).
176. Mildred J. Hudson & Barbara J. Holmes, Missing Teachers, Impaired Communities:
The Unanticipated Consequences of Brown v. Board of Education on the African American
Teaching Force at the Precollegiate Level, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 388, 388 (1994) (noting that, in
the year before Brown, about 82,000 African American teachers instructed the nation’s two
million African American students, and over the course of the next decade, “more than 38,000
Black teachers and administrators lost their positions”).
177. Gregory C. Coffin, The Black Administrator and How He’s Being Pushed to Extinction,
159 AM. SCH. BD. J. 33, 33-34 (1972). 
178. Walter A. Mercer & Mary M. Mercer, Standardized Testing: Its Impact on Blacks in
Florida’s Educational Systems, 8 URB. EDUCATOR 105, 117 (1986).
179. Greg Toppo, Thousands of Black Teachers Lost Jobs, USA TODAY (Apr. 28, 2004, 1:44
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-04-28-brown-side2_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/DM7C-6ZJ8].
180. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“[T]he cases are remanded
to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent
with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially non-
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but rather the narrow psychological injury to African American
students in segregated educational institutions.181 After all, because
the ruling was issued prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,182 the Court’s Brown decision came at a time when discrimina-
tion against African Americans was perfectly legal in many places,
and the Justices knew this.183
By declining to outlaw all racial discrimination (even if solely in
the public sector), the Court’s decision had some profoundly perni-
cious and underappreciated consequences. Specifically, while the
Court ended discrimination in one form (against African American
students), it unleashed its unremitting tide in another form (against
African American teachers). In other words, by failing to reflect
more fully on the subordination practices reflected in the segrega-
tion of students, the Court ultimately reaffirmed racial hierarchies
by decimating an entire class of African American professionals and
leaving the education of all students firmly in the hands of White
teachers. In the end, this move—which effectively perfected White
monopolization of the education system—would bolster, rather than
subvert, the cause of White supremacy for several generations to
come.
B. Assimilation and Interest Convergence: The Measure of 
Mendez I
Brown was not alone in its circumscribed conception of racial
equality. For all of its merit, the decision’s spiritual predecessor,
Mendez I, also succumbed to an implicit reaffirmation of racial
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”).
181. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954).
182. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
183. For example, it was not until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Supreme Court’s affirmance of its constitutionality in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), that federal law
broadly prohibited discrimination in public accommodations and in employment. See Robert
S. Chang, Will LGBT Antidiscrimination Law Follow the Course of Race Antidiscrimination
Law?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2103, 2143 (2016); Kirsten L. McCaw, Comment, Freedom of
Contract Versus the Antidiscrimination Principle: A Critical Look at the Tension Between
Contractual Freedom and Antidiscrimination Provisions, 7 SETON HALL CONST.L.J. 195, 208-
09 (1996).
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hierarchy and a limited, if not conditional, view of the right to be
free from discrimination. In Mendez I—the long-underappreciated
forebearer to Brown, which has begun to receive its due recognition
only in recent years184—a federal court in California ruled that a
school district’s segregation of Mexican Americans in classrooms in
the city of Westminster violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection under the law.185 Decided nearly a
decade before Brown, at a time when future Chief Justice and
Brown author Earl Warren served as Governor of California,186
Mendez I represented the first successful challenge to segregation
on constitutional grounds.187
Not surprisingly, there is much to celebrate in the district court
decision.188 Picking up on the badge of inferiority language first
184. See, e.g., Thomas A. Saenz, Commentary, Mendez and the Legacy of Brown: A Latino
Civil Rights Lawyer’s Assessment, 6 AFR.-AM.L.&POL’YREP. 194, 194-95 (2004) (“Mendez was
in many ways an important, albeit unrecognized, precursor to Brown.”).
185. Mendez I, 64 F. Supp. 544, 546-49, 551 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
186. Interestingly, Brown avoids all mention of the Mendez I case. This fact is particularly
curious because Earl Warren knew of the decision and appreciated its ramifications. Among
other things, as Governor of California when the Mendez decision was handed down, Warren
signed legislation shortly thereafter to repeal the remaining classroom segregation laws on
the books—those that had authorized segregation efforts against Native Americans and those
of Asian descent. See Charles Wollenberg, Mendez v. Westminster: Race, Nationality and
Segregation in California Schools, 53 CAL. HIST. Q. 317, 329 (1974). In addition, as Judge
Frederick P. Aguirre’s textual comparison of Brown and Mendez I points out, linguistic and
tonal similarities between the opinions make it “clear that Warren read and thoroughly
absorbed McCormick’s ruling in Mendez prior to authoring the Brown decision.” Frederick P.
Aguirre, Mendez v. Westminster School District: How It Affected Brown v. Board of Education,
4 J. HISP. HIGHER EDUC. 321, 331 (2005).
187. See Philippa Strum, “We Always Tell Our Children They Are Americans”: Mendez v.
Westminster and the Beginning of the End of School Segregation, 39 J.SUP.CT.HIST. 307, 308
(2014).
188. In retrospect, the decision represents a particularly proud moment for the United
States District Court for the Central District of California (then known as the Southern
District). In fact, the current official website of the District heralds the momentousness of the
opinion in its section regarding the court’s history. See Historical Decades: The 1940s’, U.S.
DIST.CT.CENT.DIST. OF CAL., https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/newsworthy/historical-decades/
1940s [https://perma.cc/3YE2-Q38E] (discussing the Mendez case taking place at the Los
Angeles Courthouse and finding that four school district’s policies of excluding Mexican
American children from White classrooms constituted “a violation of state law and [were]
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause,” thereby predating Brown v. Board of
Education). Interestingly, neither the court nor its website provides any acknowledgement
of the fact that the main courthouse of the district sits on the grounds of the Los Angeles
Slave Market—a market where, under the imprimatur of the State of California, Native
Americans were enslaved and sold from 1850 until the 1870s—a long forgotten and oft
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embraced by the Supreme Court in Strauder, Mendez I dealt a clear
blow against the idea of inherent racial inferiority, stating “that the
methods of segregation prevalent in the defendant school districts
foster antagonisms in the children and suggest inferiority among
them where none exists.”189 The unequivocal nature of this final
phrase put an exclamation point on the decision’s laudable and
unflinching commitment to resisting persistent notions of racial
hierarchy.
At the same time, however, the court’s defiance of hierarchy only
went so far. While the decision rejected the idea of racial superior-
ity, it did so while strongly affirming the idea of cultural
superiority.190 The court grounded its justification for desegregation
not on the rights of Mexican American children but, rather, on the
basis of an assimilationist rationale that served the good of White
Americans and the sustentation of Anglo-American cultural
institutions and ideals. “The evidence clearly shows that Spanish-
speaking children are retarded in learning English by lack of
exposure to its use because of segregation,” the court explained,
positing “that commingling of the entire student body instills and
develops a common cultural attitude among the school children
which is imperative for the perpetuation of American institutions
and ideals.”191 With these words, the court supported desegregation
as a strategic policy initiative that would strengthen the assimila-
tion of individuals of Mexican descent and inculcate them with a
reverence for “American institutions and ideals.”192
Such language echoes the rationale of affirmative action jurispru-
dence a half century later, in which the Supreme Court would suffer
the policy only to the extent that it promoted classroom diversity,
enabling primarily White college students to prepare for (leading
and managing?) a world full of non-White people.193 Such a view of
overlooked aspect of the sordid story of racial oppression in California. See Robert Petersen,
Los Angeles’ 1850s Slave Market Is Now the Site of a Federal Courthouse, KCET: LOST LA
(Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.kcet.org/shows/lost-la/los-angeles-1850s-slave-market-is-now-the-
site-of-a-federal-courthouse [https://perma.cc/7LPS-S3TU].




193. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. Notably, the Supreme Court has
rejected the idea that affirmative action can generally be used to make up for centuries of past
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remedial race-based policies feeds cynicism that on controversial
matters, equal protection and respect for civil rights arrive only
when they serve the interests of the White majority.
When considered in a vacuum, the Mendez I court’s interest in the
maintenance of American institutions and ideals appears eminently
legitimate and reasonable. But as the primary rationale for de-
segregation, it is deeply problematic, as it reflects two presumptions
that betray a more fulsome embrace of equality. First, although the
court was rejecting the notion of racial hierarchy, it was doing so
while embracing the idea of cultural and ethnic superiority.194
Apparently lacking an understanding—admittedly, a half century
early—of the theory of intersectionality,195 the court seemingly
failed to consider any link between conceptions of racial and cultural
hierarchy.
Second, the court rationalized the grant of civil rights to Mexican
Americans with an appeal to the assimilatory interests of the
majority196—interests that are grounded in perpetuating its power
and values. In the process, the court forwent a valuable opportunity
to ground norms of equal protection in a universal principle of
inclusion or an appeal to the inherent equality of the disfavored
group and its culture. Such a move not only gives further credence
to Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory,197 but it also dispels
any illusion that the court had any intention or desire to undermine
White (cultural?) supremacy. Rather, the court adopts a more
discrimination or to temper the continuing effects thereof; instead, it insists that there be a
clear nexus. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding
“that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect persons, not groups,”
and as such, even remedial race-based programs are always subject to strict scrutiny, which
requires a tight fit between the particular goal of the program and the people or entities
impacted (in that the discrimination was caused by the very entity adopting the program, and
the individuals benefitting from the program were victims of said discrimination)); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Racial classifications are
simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification.”), cited with approval in Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (“This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone
is sufficient to justify a racial classification.”).
194. See Mendez I, 64 F. Supp. at 549.
195. See Ahir Gopaldas, Intersectionality 101, 32 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 90, 91 (2013)
(explaining the theory of intersectionality).
196. See Mendez I, 64 F. Supp. at 549.
197. See Bell, supra note 165, at 94-95.
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enlightened view of equality—one of tolerance rather than pa-
ternalism—in order to advance continued Anglo-American suprem-
acy.
To be sure, there were many American institutions and ideals to
love at the time. But it is also worth noting that many aspects of
American society, which were wholly embraced by the schools and
their curricula, were less than savory.198 As such, the goal that
Mexican Americans should simply adopt Anglo-American identity
writ large ignores the many shortcomings of American institutions
and ideals at the time. Moreover, the posture reflects the court’s ob-
livion to the possibility that Mexican Americans might make their
own contributions—perhaps even grounded in their own cultural
values—to better the noble, but imperfect, experiment of American
democracy.
For all its flaws, the district court’s decision in Mendez I at least
exhibited a firm commitment to resisting the concept of racial
inferiority in a way that first-order equal protection opinions, such
as Cumming, Strauder, and Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, never did. By
contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mendez II 199 was far more
disappointing. While it ultimately affirmed the striking of Westmin-
ster’s segregation policy,200 it declined to pick up the most meaning-
ful portion of the lower court decision—Judge McCormick’s powerful
rejection of the idea that inherent racial differences exist.201 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit wholly elided core constitutional issues (and the
bigger questions of race and equality that such issues raised) by
grounding its decision in process rather than substance.202 Proudly
boasting that “[w]e are not tempted by the siren,” the court oblique-
ly rejected the call to “strike out independently on the whole
question of segregation, on the ground that recent world stirring
198. See, e.g., MELISSA F. WEINER, POWER, PROTEST, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: JEWISH
AND AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLES IN NEW YORK CITY 157-58 (2010) (arguing and detailing
how the erecting of racial barriers and the use of racial stereotypes were an express design
element of public schools historically in New York City).
199. Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez (Mendez II), 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
200. Id. at 781.
201. See Mendez I, 64 F. Supp. at 549.
202. See Mendez II, 161 F.2d at 781.
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events have set men to the reexamination of concepts considered
fixed.”203
The court then recast the case at hand from one involving
complex issues of interpretation related to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (and seemingly controlling precedent upholding the practice
of educational segregation) into one involving rogue school district
officials acting “without legislative support” in wild contravention
of state law.204 As the court set out, “there is no dispute that the law
of California does not authorize the segregation practiced” in the
case.205 Specifically, the court noted that the legislature’s segrega-
tion bill had authorized only the separation of children of “Indians
under certain conditions and children of Chinese, Japanese or
Mongolian parentage.”206 With segregation seemingly confined by
state law to “Indians and certain named Asiatics,”207 the court
concluded that Westminster officials had acted in violation of state
law by segregating school children of Mexican descent—a violation
that constituted a deprivation of due process and equal protection.208
While the ultimate outcome of the Ninth Circuit opinion was
notable, the court’s interpretation of state law was certainly
strained. It nakedly assumed that, by empowering the segregation
of children of certain ancestries, the state expressly forbade local
officials from expanding the segregation policies to children of
other ancestries, and so the court evaded any pronouncement on
the actual constitutionality of segregation.209 As such, it entirely
circumvented questions about race and discrimination that it
203. Id. at 780.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 778.
206. Id. at 780 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8003, 8004 (repealed 1947)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 781.
209. Of course, the Ninth Circuit may have adopted its logic to intentionally avert the
constitutional question—both to serve interests of judicial restraint and to avoid a direct clash
with the binding authority of Plessy. In this sense, it may have mimicked a similar approach
taken in an earlier case in 1931, when a San Diego Superior Court struck down as imper-
missible the segregation of Mexican Americans in the Lemon Grove School District. See Kristi
L. Bowman, The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1751, 1770-71, 1803-05
(2001) (discussing and reprinting Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66-625 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.,
Apr. 26, 1931), which struck down segregation of Mexican Americans, but only on the grounds
that they, unlike African American or Indian children, were not specifically mentioned as
subject to segregation in the Education Code).
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apparently preferred not to tackle. If anything, the Ninth Circuit
actually cast some doubt on the viability of the bolder portions of
the lower court’s equal-protection analysis. As Juan Perea points
out, the Ninth Circuit declined to “discuss the substantive scope of
equal protection” in its decision and even went so far as to “contra-
dict[ ] the district court’s equal-protection holding by saying, ‘for the
argument,’ that California could legally enact a statute authorizing
the segregation of Mexican-American children.”210 The holding
therefore left open the possibility that if the legislature were to
expressly authorize (or even require) the segregation of Mexican
Americans, there may be no constitutional barrier to such a move.211
Not only did Mendez II relegate the civil rights of Mexican Amer-
icans to the potential whimsies of the legislature, even Mendez I
rationalized desegregation on the basis of policy goals serving White
interests rather than a firm philosophical commitment to nondis-
crimination. Thus, while the Mendez decisions certainly achieved
the right result and paved the way for Brown’s rejection of the
constitutionality of segregation throughout the land, their diluted
vision of equal protection ultimately reflected tolerance, rather than
acceptance, of Mexican Americans. Though Mendez I formally
rejected White supremacy—a significant improvement from the
“progressive” jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century—Mendez II notably contained no such language,
and even Mendez I subordinated any potential recognition of
equality or any universal embrace of rights to more parochial ideals
of assimilation.
210. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of
American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1245 n.157, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127, 159 n.157
(1998) (citing Mendez II, 161 F.2d at 774, 781).
211. It is also notable that, despite the symbolic value of the decision, it ultimately
accomplished little by way of alleviating de facto segregation. As Charles Wollenberg notes,
studies suggest that a quarter century later effective rates of Mexican American segregation
in California were actually higher than they were at the time of the Mendez II decision. See
Wollenberg, supra note 186, at 329-30 (first citing CALIFORNIA STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., RACIAL
AND ETHNIC SURVEY OF CAL. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, PART ONE: DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS FALL 1966,
at 11 (1967); and then citing JOHN CAUGHEY, TO KILL A CHILD’S SPIRIT: THE TRAGEDY OF
SCHOOL SEGREGATION IN LOS ANGELES 11 (1973)).
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C. Second-Order Protection Beyond Race: Sexual Orientation and
the Laissez-Faire Limits of Lawrence
The diluted power of second-order protection, which is character-
ized by measured tolerance of subordinated groups without
wholesale embrace of their dignitary interests, replicates itself
outside of the context of race as well. Consider Lawrence, which
resoundingly overturned Bowers v. Hardwick212 and recognized the
constitutional right to consensual sexual intimacy.213 With its
synergetic interaction between the Equal Protection Clause and the
liberty component of substantive due process,214 Lawrence consti-
tuted a meaningful but limited advance in the rights of gays in what
Bill Eskridge has dubbed “a conservative jurisprudence of toler-
ance”—a second-order form of respect for civil rights.215 When
Laurence Tribe suggested that “Lawrence may well be remembered
as the Brown v. Board of gay and lesbian America,”216 he meant his
words to praise the historical significance of the decision. But his
statement may also be correct in a less savory sense: Lawrence, like
Brown, had similar shortcomings as far as making meaningful
strides on the issue of equality.
As Eskridge has argued, Lawrence merely required that states
“treat homosexuality as a tolerable variation,” not that they “treat
homosexuality as equivalent to heterosexuality.”217 As such, it em-
braced only a libertarian version of tolerance, which in the spirit of
“Jeremy Bentham through H.L.A. Hart and Richard Posner, ha[s]
traditionally distanced the protected conduct from standards of
212. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
213. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
214. Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1025 (arguing that forces of equal protection and liberty
combined together to create the “jurisprudence of tolerance” advanced by the Lawrence
holding); Symposium, Panel Two: Living with Lawrence, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 299, 314
(2006) (“[A] number of people have started to write about Lawrence as being an ‘equal liberty’
decision, that doctrinally is grounded both in substantive due process and in equal protection.
I think of substantive due process as being the major chord in the decision and equal
protection being the minor chord or the melody, because there is so much equality language.
What gives the opinion in Lawrence a lot of its magisterial quality is the resonance with civil
rights rhetoric.”). 
215. Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1064-65.
216. Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1895 (2004).
217. Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1065.
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morality.”218 Thus, while it prohibited the effective criminalization
of homosexuality, it showed no acceptance for homosexuality. In
short, Lawrence achieved second-order tolerance, at best.
In a sequence of sentences that capture the tone of the entire
decision, the conclusion to Justice Kennedy’s majority decision tells
us:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.219
This framing language directly signals the problematic assumptions
and limitations undergirding the Court’s recognition of gay rights.
First, whatever respect the opinion grants homosexuality, it is
ultimately replete with a heavy air of “moral distance.”220 To
illustrate this point, Eskridge compares the “lavish ode to hetero-
sexual marriage” that concluded Justice Douglas’s opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut, with Justice Kennedy’s circumspect com-
ments telling us that Lawrence is not a case involving minors, lack
of consent, public conduct, or prostitution but rather “two adults
who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sex-
ual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.”221 The tone of the
former is celebratory and affirming—a quintessential example of
third-order protection—by referring to heterosexual marriage as
both sacred and noble.222 The tone of the latter is more libertari-
an and indifferent, even clumsy (if not offensive) in its reference
to the “homosexual lifestyle.”223 The decision’s restraint and aloof
language are especially strange because Justice Kennedy, much
to the consternation of his critics224 and glee of his admirers, has
218. Id.
219. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
220. Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1065.
221. Id. at 1065-66 (first citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); and then
quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
222. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
223. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
224. See, e.g., id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mocking Justice Kennedy’s language from
2021] PATERNALISM, TOLERANCE & ACCEPTANCE 1665
never shied away from waxing philosophical with grandiloquent,
soaring language in his opinions.225
Second, the majority opinion’s concluding language shows the
pains taken by the Court to rationalize its decision in a carefully
circumscribed manner. Thus, the holding is buttressed not by an
affirmative recognition of the positive attributes of sexual liberty
but rather by what this particular instance of sexual liberty is not
(that is, not a case involving minors, lack of consent, public conduct,
or prostitution).226 Thus, the Court’s recognition of the right to be
free from unwanted government intrusion into intimate affairs
comes in a manner that is reactive rather than proactive. In the
end, therefore, the Court does not positively embrace protection for
the rights of adults, particularly same-sex couples, to engage in con-
sensual sexual relations; instead, it begrudgingly adopts a position
of noninterference with sexual relations when they do not create
other independent harms (for example, by involving children or
money, occurring in public or without consent, or suggesting the
endorsement of the state).227 In sum, Lawrence represents a decision
not to punish—not a decision to accept.
All told, therefore, Lawrence epitomizes the limitations of second-
order protection. It is laissez-faire at best, and it does not put
forward a positive case for the right of autonomy and nondiscrimi-
nation. It fails to take on tropes of heteronormativity and, instead,
views homosexuality as a deviation from the norm that should be
tolerated but not accepted. And while it does not espouse the
express language of supremacy, it fails to attack and undo subordi-
nation.
III. ENVISIONING THIRD-ORDER PROTECTION
As Brown, Mendez I and II, and Lawrence demonstrate, even de-
cisions that hold a secure place in the civil rights firmament suf-
fer from shortcomings that limit the potential protections afforded
Casey as the “famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage”).
225. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”).
226. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
227. See id.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment. After all, the greatest jurispru-
dential triumphs are frequently adulterated by internal compro-
mises, political and practical considerations, and the law’s natural
bent towards restraint.228 But even if we do not live in an ideal
world characterized by optimal proclamations of equality under the
law, that should not prevent us from imagining what shape such
decisions might take. To that end, it is worth considering what a
jurisprudence of acceptance, rather than mere tolerance, might look
like. Unlike second-order protection, third-order protection would be
proactive, rather than reactive; it would commend, rather than
countenance, marginalized groups; and it would renounce, rather
than stay silent on, supremacy and hierarchy. In short, under a
third-order version of protection, the machinery of the state would
actually celebrate the dignity of those with targeted traits and
affirmatively decry, and push back against, the subordination of
such groups.
The evolution of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence on sexual
orientation, as reflected by his majority opinions in Lawrence,229
Windsor,230 and Obergefell,231 traces a path toward third-order
protection of sexual orientation. But, as a close reading of this
jurisprudence reflects, it is a path still impeded by, among other
things, the continued obeisance of the courts to the immutability
requirement and a conditionality that rewards sameness or verisi-
militude (but not necessarily difference) with protection.
A. Third-Order Protection and the Evolution of Sexual-
Orientation Jurisprudence
As we have seen, despite the vigor of its ultimate holding,
Lawrence failed to embrace more than a laissez-faire, diluted
version of second-order equal protection.232 However, Justice
228. See, e.g., William J. Haun, The Virtues of Judicial Self-Restraint, NAT’L AFFS., Fall
2018, at 60 (“By confining judicial analysis to what the American people adopted in text when
they originally made law ... , judicial self-restraint ensures that courts cannot invalidate or
impose upon the liberty to make laws.”).
229. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
230. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
231. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
232. See supra Part II.C.
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Kennedy and the Court’s majority went further and did better a
decade later. With Windsor and Obergefell, the Court came closer to
embracing third-order protection and actively celebrating diverse
sexual identities.
In Windsor, the Court deemed the federal government’s refusal
to acknowledge same-sex marriages as a direct blow to the “dignity”
that certain states had conferred upon such relationships.233
Nevertheless, the tenor of the opinion still reflects a certain
remoteness and unease. Instead of praising the actual dignity of
same-sex marriage (as the Supreme Court did a half century earlier
with respect to heterosexual marriage,)234 the Court’s language is far
more circumspect in recognizing, on federalism grounds, the need
to respect “a status the State finds to be dignified and proper.”235 The
opinion therefore employs extensive use of the passive voice to steer
clear of any normative judgment about the value of same-sex
marriage. For example, noting recent recognition of same-sex
marriages by some states, the Court observes that “[t]he limitation
of lawful marriage to heterosexual couples, which for centuries had
been deemed both necessary and fundamental, came to be seen in
New York and certain other States as an unjust exclusion.”236 The
Court is careful to separate its judgment (which is ostensibly
neutral) on the recognition of same-sex marriage from the judgment
of the states that had embraced it.
Justice Kennedy and the Court finally broke through in Oberge-
fell, however, proclaiming that “[t]here is dignity in the bond
between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their
autonomy to make such profound choices”237 and concluding that
any refusal to legally sanctify same-sex marriage would constitute
“[t]he imposition of [a] disability on gays and lesbians [that] serves
to disrespect and subordinate them.”238 Gone is the hopelessly passé
language about the “homosexual lifestyle.”239 In its place, a suddenly
woke Court is taking a page from the Foucault playbook and talking
233. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768-69.
234. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
235. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
237. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666 (2015) (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
238. Id. at 675.
239. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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about subordination.240 Thus, Obergefell came close to embracing a
third-order vision of respect, promoting acceptance, and denouncing
hierarchy. Yet even Obergefell suffers from critical limitations in its
rationale that preclude its embrace of a more capacious notion of
equal protection.
B. From Tolerance to Acceptance: Equal Protection and the
Constricting Nature of the Immutability Factor
First, Obergefell’s grounding of rights in the purported immutabil-
ity of sexual orientation critically limits the decision’s scope and
power. Indeed, the continued fetishization of immutability in Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence has played a key role in stymieing
judicial embrace of third-order protection.241 Historically, of course,
equal protection scrutiny has relied on a suspect-category heuristic
that determines the level of scrutiny applied to any given govern-
mental classification.242 Among other things, for reasons that are
understandable, accidental, and illogical,243 the perceived immuta-
bility of a trait is a key factor in this heuristic.244 Yet, as Jessica
Clarke has posited, an excessive emphasis on immutability can un-
dermine the main goals of antidiscrimination laws, which seek “to
disrupt the stereotypes, stigmatizing practices, and superficial
240. See supra note 1.
241. John Tehranian, Changing Race: Fluidity, Immutability, and the Evolution of Equal-
Protection Jurisprudence, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 79 (2019).
242. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
243. See Tehranian, supra note 241, at 41-46 (discussing the accidental, but under-
standable, elevation of immutability into the equal protection calculus and critiquing its
dangerous consequences).
244. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that “the most stringent level of [judicial] review” is applied to governmental
distinctions drawn on the basis of immutable traits, as “immutable characteristics, which bear
no relation to individual merit or need, are irrelevant to almost every governmental decision”);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (“[T]he [ordinary] presumption of statutory
validity may also be undermined [on equal protection grounds] when a State has enacted
legislation creating classes based upon certain ... immutable human attributes.”). Courts also
consider a history of discrimination against the group, the lack of any link between the
group’s trait and ability to perform or contribute to society, and political powerlessness of the
group in determining whether a trait qualifies as suspect. See, e.g., Whitewood v. Wolf, 992
F. Supp. 2d 410, 426-30 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (summarizing the extant jurisprudence establishing
the four factors to determine heightened scrutiny).
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judgments that contribute to systems of inequality.”245 After all, if
immutability becomes the sine qua non of juridical determinations
on suspect, as opposed to fair, classifications, unreasonable forms of
bias and laws borne of irrational prejudice can easily escape judicial
scrutiny so long as those traits are formally mutable. Thus, as I
have argued in my prior scholarship, 
use of immutability as an attempted proxy for fairness comes
with significant problems. It may be true that, as a normative
matter, we should not allow, or at least should strictly scruti-
nize, laws differentiating amongst people on the basis of traits
which they cannot control. But our entire society is based on pre-
cisely that kind of differentiation.246
After all, we consider many accidents of birth, such as mental apti-
tude or physical ability, to constitute perfectly reasonable grounds
upon which to base public policy or draw legal distinctions.247 As I
have previously asserted,
it is not really immutable traits that equal protection seems to
protect. Rather, it is distinctions that lack (or almost always
lack) merit (of which certain accidents of birth are a subspecies).
Thus, it is fairness that actually lies at the heart of equal
protection, and heightened scrutiny therefore attaches when
there is good reason to suspect that a particular classification
arises not from sound public policy but, rather, from irrational
prejudice, bias, or even animus.248
If equal protection is not about protecting us from discrimination
on the basis of birth traits, it is about the protection of suspect-
245. Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 102 (2015).
246. Tehranian, supra note 241, at 49; see also id. at 49-50 (“Whether rightfully or not, the
post-Westphalian notion of the nation-state and the meaningful enforcement of borders and
immigration laws seem to require disparate treatment of people on the basis of whether they
happened, by the lottery of birth, to be born to a family with citizenship or on domestic soil.
Meanwhile, the entire premise of capitalism is based upon solicitude to economic productivity
and efficiency, thereby mandating discrimination on the basis of mental and physical abilities
in many contexts, regardless of whether these characteristics are immutable (and, in at least
some cases, they indisputably are).”); see, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
247. Tehranian, supra note 241, at 50.
248. Id.
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class-related identity traits (whether the product of birth or
otherwise) that have no link to merit but have been the subject
of historical targeting as a result of animus or bias.249
Because many of our most rigorously scrutinized suspect categories
(such as race and gender) “ha[ve] strong performative elements and
[identities] can change (sometimes with individual choice, some-
times without), the decisions associated with that change should
properly come under the scope of equal protection.”250 However, “our
equal-protection jurisprudence has rarely been read so capaciously,”
as courts have typically ignored the possibility of either individual
or societal agency in the construction of identities.251
Immutability’s starring role in the suspect-classification analysis
has therefore limited the ability of equal protection doctrine to
advance a jurisprudence of acceptance rather than mere tolerance.
If we removed or relaxed immutability considerations from the
equal protection calculus, we would “open up heightened scrutiny
for characteristics that are inextricably related to” key identity
traits that “constitute choices rather than ‘accidents of birth,’” but
against which irrational prejudice is systemic.252 In the process, we
would achieve more than just vindication “of the right to be free of
discrimination from traits over which we have no control”; we would
also extend protection to traits over which we might have control
but which are essential to our personhood and sense of identity.253
Putting aside the extent to which such a reconstituted vision of
equal protection would expand the areas of protection provided by
the Fourteenth Amendment, it would undoubtedly elevate the
theoretical underpinnings of areas in which protection is currently
extended, as scrutiny would no longer be conditioned (at least
partially) on evidence over whether a trait constitutes an accident
of birth or choice. For too long, equal protection norms have relied
on the assumption that a trait must be protected because those with
249. Id. at 51.
250. Id.
251. Id. For example, see the jurisprudence denying protection to characteristics such as
hairstyle and language because such attributes are mutable. See id. at 51-57 (discussing and
critiquing said jurisprudence).
252. Id. at 59.
253. Id.
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it cannot control it. Such a constrained view of equal protection
breeds reluctant tolerance while eschewing real acceptance and
celebration of identities, fixed or chosen.254
Thus, “the continuing fetishization of immutability in the equal-
protection calculus has impeded the realization of a jurisprudence
of acceptance (rather than one of just mere tolerance)” to categoriza-
tions that, although partially or wholly chosen, “have little to no
link to merit and have a long history of being targeted on the basis
of animus and bias.”255 Obergefell epitomizes the dangerous
consequences of this dynamic through its consideration of discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation and the debate over
whether sexual orientation is a mutable trait.256 With its decision in
the case, the Supreme Court famously recognized the constitutional
right to same sex marriage.257 In the process, as I have argued in
another article, the Court took
critical steps towards celebrating the dignitary interests of gays
and affirmatively renounc[ing], and push[ing] back against, all
discrimination against individuals on the basis of sexual
orientation. But an exegesis of Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion [in Obergefell] suggests that the Court’s continued need
to grapple with the issue of immutability (as compelled[, in
part,] by the extant jurisprudence) ultimately diminished the
force of Obergefell ’s blow against subordination practices and its
celebration of diverse sexualities.258
To begin, Justice Kennedy’s decision unnecessarily, and harm-
fully, goes out of its way to assert the immutability of sexual
orientation.259 Because “the Court ultimately did not [expressly]
grant heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation, the decision did not
need to deal with the issue of immutability.”260 Nevertheless, in a
remarkable line, Justice Kennedy bluntly states, “[I]n more recent
years[,] ... psychiatrists and others [have] recognized that sexual
254. See id. at 67.
255. Id. at 60.
256. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 661-62 (2015).
257. Id. at 675.
258. Tehranian, supra note 241, at 60.
259. These reasons first appeared in id. at 61-62.
260. Id. at 61 (footnote omitted).
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orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and
immutable.”261 This reasoning “signal[ed] a change in [the Court’s]
prior position, which viewed homosexuality as a ‘lifestyle’ and,
implicitly, a choice.”262 In making this change, Kennedy relied on
evidence from an American Psychological Association (APA) amicus
brief.263 But as I have previously noted, this source never made a
claim of immutability:
[T]he APA carefully eschewed taking an absolute position on
orientation fluidity and, in fact, expressly avoided use of the
word “immutable.” In tempered language, the APA Brief
concluded that sexual orientation ... “[i]s [g]enerally [n]ot chosen,
and [i]s [h]ighly [r]esistant to [c]hange.” To support this state-
ment, the APA Brief noted that 88% of gay men and 68% of
lesbians reported that they had ‘no choice at all’ in their
orientation—meaning that 12% of gay men and 32% of lesbians
suggested they may have had some level of choice. To wit, the
APA brief recounted that 5% of gay men and 16% of lesbians
reported feeling that they had ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a great deal’ of
choice regarding their sexual orientation. In short, Kennedy’s
citation to the APA Brief to establish the purported immutabil-
ity of sexual orientation was, at best, disingenuous.264
In light of these facts, Justice Kennedy’s curious insistence on as-
serting the immutability of sexual orientation begs further exami-
nation. Given the historical linkage between immutability and
heightened scrutiny, Justice Kennedy may have sought to lay the
groundwork for the Court, in a future decision, to finally embrace
intermediate or strict scrutiny for classifications pertaining to sex-
ual orientation.265 The failure of the Court to do so in Obergefell may
have reflected a gradualist approach to give time for the vox populi
to reach greater consensus on the matter. Such a stratagem is not
without its dangers, however. As I have argued elsewhere,
261. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 661.
262. Tehranian, supra note 241, at 61 (footnote omitted).
263. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 661.
264. Tehranian, supra note 241, at 61-62 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
265. See id. at 62.
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such a tactic takes a backwards approach to the constitutional
protection of civil rights because the need for heightened judicial
scrutiny—and a check on majoritarianism—is at its greatest
when there is widespread animus against a “discreet and insular
minority,” not when public acceptance of that minority has
finally been achieved.266
Obergefell’s appeal to conceptions of immutability does not end
with same-sex couples themselves; it also extends to the (potential)
children raised in such relationships. Specifically, the decision ex-
presses great concern for the dignitary interests of same-sex off-
spring, who will suffer harm and humiliation, through no choice of
their own, so long as the law expressly embraces a heteronormative
view of what constitutes family.267 Curiously, the link between
recognition of same-sex marriage and the protection of children
reflects a trend found in other Western courts. As Debora Spar has
argued, it was not until significant advances in reproductive
technology that enabled same-sex couples to have children who were
biologically related to at least one parent that courts in countries
like Spain and Sweden began to accept same-sex unions by invoking
the state’s interest in protecting children with a durable and
recognized family structure.268 Similarly, the Obergefell Court ex-
presses acute concern over the shame that children of same-sex
relationships might face, arguing that “[w]ithout the recognition,
stability, and predictability marriage offers, [the] children [of same-
sex couples] suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser.... The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”269 This striking lan-
guage, which passionately references the humiliation of the children
of same-sex couples, stands in stark contrast to the Court’s more
reserved and clinical language regarding the impact that failure
to recognize same-sex marriage has on same-sex partners them-
selves—that it “disrespect[s] and subordinate[s] them.”270 These
266. Id. (footnotes omitted).
267. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 667-69.
268. DEBORA L. SPAR, WORK MATE MARRY LOVE: HOW MACHINES SHAPE OUR HUMAN
DESTINY 114-15 (2020).
269. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 667-69.
270. Id. at 675.
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rhetorical flourishes make it only fair to ask why the Court seems
to emphasize the dignitary harms endured by the (potential)
children of same-sex couples over those suffered by heterosexual
couples. “After all, no matter how badly societal stigmas might hurt
the children of such couples, they will impact the couples them-
selves most immediately and for their entire lives.”271 In the end,
therefore, one could argue that Obergefell is ultimately attempting
“to reconcile the decision on the grounds of someone’s immutability.
Unable to definitively establish the immutability of the same-sex
parents’ sexual orientation, the Court points to the protection of
their children, who possess the immutable [that is, faultless] status
of being born to same-sex parents.”272
As Justice Kennedy is quick to remind us, the children of same-
sex couples “suffer the significant material costs of being raised by
unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a
more difficult and uncertain family life.”273 With these words,
Justice Kennedy enables those who might still cast moral oppro-
brium on same-sex intimacy to nonetheless support recognition of
same-sex marriage.274 As a result, his apophasic flourish here may
evince
an argumentative strategy, employed to persuade those who
may believe that homosexuality is a chosen lifestyle (and an im-
moral one at that, not entitled to constitutional protection) but
who might soften their position to protect children of homosexu-
als who cannot and should not be forced to answer for the
perceived sins of their parents.275
Cast in such a strategic, rather than moralistic, light, use of such a
rhetorical device is not without precedent. In fact, it mirrors the
rationale in Plyler v. Doe when the Supreme Court invalidated, on
equal protection grounds, a Texas law denying public education to
the children of undocumented aliens.276 While the Plyler Court 
271. Tehranian, supra note 241, at 62.
272. Id. at 63.
273. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added).
274. See Tehranian, supra note 241, at 64.
275. Id. at 63.
276. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see also Tehranian, supra note 241, at 63.
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acknowledged that immigration status technically constituted a
mutable characteristic generally subject only to rational-basis
review, it raised an analytical distinction between undocumented
adults and their children, in that a law specifically targeting the
rights of the latter rather than just the former would constitute an
attack against those who have a status they have acquired “through
no fault of their own”277—the exact same phrase used by the
Obergefell Court in discussing the need to protect the dignitary
interests of the children of same-sex couples.278 As the Plyler Court
explained,
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may
withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within
the United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct.
These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifica-
tions imposing disabilities on the minor children of such illegal
entrants.279
Of course, when the government denies benefits to undocumented
adults, the consequences quickly flow to their undocumented child-
ren.280 But the basic laws of fungibility did not stop the Court from
applying a more searching form of rational basis review in Plyler
given the undocumented children’s “accident of birth.”281
Just as Plyler left room for future courts to accept laws targeting
undocumented adults (rather than those merely targeting their
children), Obergefell did not entirely foreclose the viability of future
legislation drawing distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation.
Perhaps most significantly, the Court declined the opportunity to
deem sexual orientation a suspect classification,282 thereby leaving
277. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
278. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668.
279. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20. The Court added that, because the Texas law was “directed
against children, and impose[d] its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic
over which children can have little control,” it could not survive an equal protection challenge.
Id. at 220. 
280. See generally Immigrants and Public Benefits: What Does the Research Say?,
BIPARTISAN POL’YCTR. (2018), https://www.immigrationresearch.org/system/files/Immigrants-
and-Public-Benefits-What-Does-the-Research-Say.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDE7-7LGB]. 
281. See Tehranian, supra note 241, at 63-64.
282. Id. at 64 & n.232 (citing Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay Marriage and
the Failure of Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP.CT.REV. 115, 117 (2016) (referencing Obergefell’s
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its victory for gay rights on fragile grounds and subject to the whims
of future jurists who may be less inclined to apply a particularly
searching form of rational basis to laws related to sexual orienta-
tion.283 As a result, Obergefell did not constitute quite as complete
a triumph against subordination on the basis of sexual orientation
as it might have seemed at first blush.284
All the while, the analytical importance that Obergefell continued
to assign to the trope of immutability in the equal-protection
calculus raises additional concerns.285 Based largely on the template
employed in the fight for gender equality and the immutability
language adopted by Frontiero and its progeny, gay rights activists
have, for many years, focused their litigation strategies on present-
ing sexual orientation as an immutable trait that is therefore
subject to heightened scrutiny.286 As a result of these efforts, several
circuits have applied heightened scrutiny to laws distinguishing on
the basis of sexual orientation.287 Of course, to date, the Supreme
Court has declined to follow suit.288 Nevertheless, the Court has
applied an especially rigorous type of rational basis review to such
laws.289
lack of “discussion of tiers of review, suspect classes, strict scrutiny, or narrow tailoring”)).
283. See id. at 64.
284. See id. at 64-65.
285. See id. at 65.
286. Id. at 65 & n.234 (citing Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1196 n.12 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974) (considering (and rejecting) a same-sex couple’s claim that discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation should be given heightened scrutiny on the grounds that “homosexuals
constitute ‘a politically voiceless and invisible minority’[;] that being homosexual, generally
speaking, is an immutable characteristic[;] and that homosexuals are a group with a long
history of discrimination subject to myths and stereotypes” (citations omitted))).
287. Id. at 65 & n.235 (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 740 F.3d 471,
480-81 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), as
dictating the application of heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation
even though Windsor was silent on the issue of standard of review)); Windsor v. United
States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir. 2012) (weighing the extant Supreme Court factors on
whether a classification is suspect to ultimately hold that laws distinguishing on the basis of
sexual orientation are subject to heightened scrutiny), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
288. “Though the Court described sexual orientation as ‘immutable’ in [the] Obergefell
[majority decision,] it did not hold that sexual orientation was a suspect classification entitled
to heightened scrutiny.” Tehranian, supra note 241, at 65 n.236 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644, 661 (2015)).
289. Id. at 65 & n.237 (citing William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational
Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 523 (2005) (describing the purported
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These decisions have ultimately advanced protection for gay
rights, but their reliance on notions of immutability have left some
activists nervous—and with good reason.290 After all, if the protec-
tion of sexual orientation rests on a belief in its immutability, it is
fair to wonder what happens if, in the future, a scientific consensus
determines that it is the product of both nature and nurture, there-
by putting at risk extant protections.291 By grounding suspect-class
status in immutability, the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that
traits that are the product of choice should not enjoy the same legal
protections as those that truly cannot be altered.292 But such a quix-
otic quest to segregate the immutable from the chosen (and the en-
suing hierarchy of protection for traits immutable versus traits
chosen) ensures less than full recognition of dignitary interests.293
In the same manner, the primacy of immutability in the broader
equal-protection framework has also suppressed the advancement
of protection for traits, such as ethnic hairstyles and language, that
are intricately related to race but, in the most formalistic conception
application of rational basis review in recent sexual orientation as, in fact, “rational basis
plus”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759 (2011)
(describing the purported application of rational basis in recent sexual-orientation cases as,
in fact, “rational basis with bite”)).
290. Id. at 65-66 & 66 n.238 (citing Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards
Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 921 (1989));
cf. Lisa M. Diamond & Clifford J. Rosky, Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on Sexual
Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for Sexual Minorities, 53 J. SEX RSCH. 363 (2016)
(arguing against reliance on immutability). 
291. See Tehranian, supra note 241, at 66 & n. 239 (citing Sexual Orientation &
Homosexuality, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (2008), https://www.apa.org/topics/lgbtq/orientation
[https://perma.cc/M4AZ-CX9H] (“There is no consensus among scientists about the exact
reasons that an individual develops ... [their] orientation” and that “[m]any think that nature
and nurture both play complex roles; most people experience little or no sense of choice about
their sexual orientation.”)).
292. Id. at 66-67 (“Such a view troublingly replicates certain [disavowed] institutional
positions that have effectively treated gays as second-class citizens while paying lip service
to tolerance. For almost two decades [(1994-2010)], of course, the American military carried
out the inordinately tortured ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy that enabled gay men and women
to serve in the military but forced them to suppress entire parts of their identities that their
heterosexual colleagues were able to enjoy openly. Similarly, numerous churches have taken
the position of allowing gay parishioners into their community so long as those individuals
do not engage in same-sex relations. Such equivocal regimes implicitly draw a distinction
between what individuals purportedly cannot control (being ‘born gay’) and what they
purportedly can (acting upon their sexual attraction).” (footnotes omitted)). 
293. Id. at 67.
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of the word, remain technically mutable and therefore evade height-
ened constitutional scrutiny.294
By conditioning the extension of rights on immutability, such
practices “effectively exclude[ ] the volitional components of one’s
sexual identity [or other identity-related traits] from protection and,
in the process, impede[ ] a complete acceptance (let alone celebra-
tion) of diverse [identities].”295 By contrast, if heightened scrutiny
applied “to a trait regardless of its mutability,” such a tact would
“send[ ] a far more powerful message of inclusion from the judiciary
than a reluctant tolerance grounded in immutability.”296 While the
Obergefell decision failed to recognize this point, it did acknowledge
the importance that judicial recognition of rights can have in terms
of leading, rather than merely reflecting, societal advances in
tolerance and acceptance of historically marginalized groups.297
With this fact in mind, it is worth noting that “[w]hen legal
protection becomes available to individuals whether they are acting
on the basis of immutable biology or volitional choice (such as the
very decision to marry), the message of respect becomes all the more
powerful since it reflects affirmative acceptance, rather than passive
tolerance.”298 All told, the festishization of immutability has limited
the potential and potency of our equal-protection jurisprudence.
294. See, e.g., id. at 51 (“Courts have consistently embraced the immutability factor as a
mechanism to deny protection to such traits as hairstyle and language on the grounds that
such characteristics are mutable; but, in fact, such characteristics are part and parcel of the
performance of race. An exegesis of relevant case jurisprudence on matters such as language
and hairstyle demonstrates the way in which the continued use of the immutability factor has
actively impeded the development of a jurisprudence of acceptance and has prevented the
Equal Protection Clause from achieving its full potential in putting an end to government
action that unfairly targets racial groups on the basis of irrational bias.”). 
295. Id. at 67.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 67 & n.245 (first citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015) (closing
its penultimate paragraph by stating the following: “They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of
the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”); and then citing Kyle C. Velte, Obergefell’s
Expressive Promise, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF RECORD 157, 161 (2015) (“The expressive function
of U.S. Supreme Court opinions is particularly powerful because most Americans take note
of the decisions. The Court’s opinions take on a symbolic character because they are seen as
‘speaking on behalf of the nation’s basic principles and commitments.’”)).
298. Id. at 67.
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C. Acceptance and the Problem of “Like-Straight” and 
Assimilatory Logic
The shortcomings of our extant equal-protection jurisprudence, as
illustrated by Obergefell, also extend beyond its embrace of immu-
tability. Obergefell ultimately rests its extension of rights to a mi-
nority group (gay people) based on that group’s putative similarity
to a majority group (straight people).299 In the process, it embraces
a limited notion of equal protection that elides acceptance of
lifestyles beyond the heteronormative.300 As such, the decision
effectively reinforces extant hierarchies based on the values of the
majority and conditions the extension of rights to groups that will
most closely hue to majoritarian norms. After all, as Justice
Kennedy himself tells us, his Obergefell opinion is fundamentally
premised on the idea that “[t]he nature of marriage is that, through
its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms,
such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all
persons, whatever their sexual orientation.”301 While the universal-
ism of such rhetoric has humanistic appeal, it is worth stepping
back and unpacking its logical implications: the extension of rights
should be conditioned on a showing of sameness rather than an
acceptance (or celebration) of difference.
In the process, Obergefell falls prey to broader systemic shortcom-
ings in the development of modern equal protection jurisprudence,
which has largely vindicated the idea of tolerance at the expense of
acceptance. Such jurisprudence has therefore failed to celebrate
difference or truly attack subordination practices that prioritize
rights based on the extent to which majority interests and values
are supported under the aegis of universalism. For example, in her
book From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation & Constitu-
tional Law, Martha Nussbaum charts how, over time, American
constitutional jurisprudence has moved from a recognition of the
“politics of disgust” to a “politics of humanity” in its approach to
issues of sexual orientation.302 Nussbaum’s narrative of progress
299. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665-67.
300. See id.
301. Id. at 2599.
302. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION &
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praises how courts have evolved in their view of homosexuality.303
But such a view of progress is not without its significant limitations
and problems. Just as Justice Kennedy does in Obergefell, Nuss-
baum focuses support for the extension of rights on the “politics of
similarity,” or a search to recognize the inherent humanity of people
with different beliefs and practices than our own and to appreciate
that such people are “like” us.304
However, as Courtney Cahill has powerfully retorted, a “politics
of similarity” approach to civil rights has actually impoverished
the evolution of sexual orientation jurisprudence because it has
resulted in excessive reliance on argumentation that seeks to
vindicate rights on the basis of replication of heteronormative
conduct—“like-straight” reasoning.305 Marriage equality proponents
have advocated, and the Supreme Court ultimately adopted,
justifications for marriage equality that rest on the seductive idea
“that gays and straights are (virtually) the same.”306 In the pro-
cess, however, such arguments ultimately “reinforce[ ] the abstract
logic that to be an equal one must be the same.”307 The logic is
dangerous in that it implicitly conditions the continued extension
of rights on continued perceptions of sameness, rather than ex-
tending rights even if there are differences between the groups.
Such a conditional view of equal protection seems to mimic the
rationale of race-related equal protection cases, such as Mendez II,
that struck segregation on the basis of assimilatory interests.308 It
also finds resonance in the realpolitik of Harlan’s Plessy dissent,
which encouraged desegregation to reduce racial turmoil, partic-
ularly with White majoritarianism (and supremacy) secure.309 In
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (2010).
303. See id.
304. Id. at 48; Courtney Megan Cahill, Disgust and the Problematic Politics of Similarity,
109 MICH. L. REV. 943, 945 (2011) (reviewing NUSSBAUM, supra note 302).
305. Cahill, supra note 304, at 950-51.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 951 (quoting Marc Spindelman, Op-Ed, Sodomy Politics in Lawrence v. Texas,
JURIST (June 12, 2003), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew115.php).
308. See Mendez II, 161 F.2d 774, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1947).
309. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Sixty millions
of whites are in no danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of
the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both
require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more
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the context of sexual orientation, such a view “arguably pushes
marriage-equality advocates to turn to like-straight reasoning even
more than they already do” and, in the process, forces groups to seek
recognition of their civil rights “to sacrifice difference in order to be
viewed by others as civilized human subjects” worthy of equal
rights.310 In short, such an approach to equal protection fails to
envision the value and power of celebrating difference instead of
fetishizing similarity.311
Consider, for example, the underappreciated extent to which the
reasoning of Obergefell implicitly rests the protection of the funda-
mental right to marry on homosexual replication of traditional
models of matrimony—notions that elevate societal interests in
child-rearing above wholly individualistic notions of intimacy or
broader ideas of self-fulfillment.312 This is first expressed in the
Court’s strong emphasis on the grave harm that denial of marriage
equality inflicts on the children of same-sex couples, a move
grounded in the assumption that marriage strongly benefits
children.313 Notably, this concept comes to the fore when the Court
discusses its (purportedly progressive) rejection of the marriage-as-
procreation trope.314 Just after concluding the critical interest
against stigmatizing the children of same-sex couples by denying
the right to same-sex marriage, the Court cautions that its recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage is not solely justified by the need to
protect the interests of children: “That is not to say the right to
marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have
children.”315 Yet this admonition is followed by a curious caveat:
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens?”).
310. Cahill, supra note 304, at 956.
311. Id. at 959. Cahill does note that Nussbaum has, elsewhere, championed a “deep
respect for qualitative difference” that is an essential “part of the idea of [human] flourishing.”
Id. at 950 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC
JUSTICE 45 (1995)).
312. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665-67 (2015).
313. See id. at 667-69.
314. See id. at 669.
315. Id.
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An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not
been a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State. In light of
precedent protecting the right of a married couple not to pro-
create, it cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned
the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate.
The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which
childbearing is only one.316
The phraseology of this language—which purports to embrace a
more capacious notion of marriage than the historic vision grounded
in procreation and perpetuation of the species—is worthy of further
analysis. The Court expressly warns that neither procreation nor
childbearing can serve as conditions of marriage.317 But it makes no
mention of child-rearing, which was the actual subject of the
immediate predecessor paragraph to which these words serve as a
nota bene.318 In that prior paragraph, the Court took pains to
highlight the devastating psychological toll that denial of same-sex
marriage has on the children raised (but not necessarily borne) by
such couples.319
Read carefully as if every word choice matters (which is certainly
the case in a decision with as much anticipation and understood
significance as Obergefell), the Court’s failure to clarify that
marriage protection is not conditioned on child-rearing activities
(rather than procreation or child-bearing activities) is significant.
The Court is implying, if not outright suggesting, that societal and
legal interests in the recognition of same-sex marriage are at their
apex when same-sex couples are mimicking the traditional
heteronormative notions of marriage through child-rearing activi-
ties. The pregnant assumption is that without this important child-
rearing function, same-sex coupling might not warrant the right to
marriage. From the Court’s perspective, recognition of same-sex
marriage is therefore imbued with the understanding or hope that
homosexual couples will replicate a model of marriage driven by
child-rearing and conventional notions of family, with the only
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 668.
319. See id.
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difference to a heterosexual marriage being the gender of the
participants.
Obergefell’s implicit conditioning of civil-rights protection on
replicating majority culture and lifestyles is not an outlier. It finds
strong echoes in Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence critique of
Brown320 and in the Mendez I district court’s appeal to Anglo-
American cultural superiority and assimilation.321 It also finds a
voice in modern affirmative action jurisprudence, which rests the
acceptability of remedial policies on their continued benefit to the
White majority.322 In the end, the ongoing grounding of conceptions
of equality in such instrumentalist logic belies the purported
security and inalienability of Fourteenth Amendment protections
and weakens the value of our constitutional rights and the dignitary
interests they are meant to protect.
IV. CALLING BALLS AND STRIKES: CAVEATS AND CONCLUSION
While we have moved, at certain moments, toward a third-order
vision of equal protection, we have still not achieved it. While such
a goal seems laudable to this observer, it is important to caution and
understand that other jurists and scholars may not be so sanguine
about courts entering such rhetorical and philosophical terrain. In
particular, one might object that it would be inappropriate for courts
to engage in acceptance and celebration and abandon their neutral
role to just “call balls and strikes.”323 But, as even the most sincere
advocates of the homespun balls-and-strike metaphor must ulti-
mately admit, baseball’s own strike zone is neither static nor
neutral. Not only has it changed dramatically over time,324 but there
320. Bell, supra note 165, at 94-96.
321. See Mendez I, 64 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
322. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
323. See Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641, 641 (2011) (examining the
famous metaphor that Chief Justice John Roberts presented to the Senate Judiciary
Committee during his confirmation hearings, and noting that Chief Justice Roberts “has been
both praised and scorned” for it); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the
Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1994) (“[B]ecause of a need to limit the clash between public
judgments and judicial judgments in so sensitive an area[,] I therefore argue for the narrowest
and most incremental of the judicial possibilities.”).
324. See Strike Zone, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/rules/strike-zone
[https://perma.cc/AH5H-DJ7M] (documenting the numerous changes to the official definition
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is a widely known and accepted discrepancy between its rule book
definition and its application.325 Perhaps most fundamentally of all,
baseball’s strike zone has always varied for each and every player.
The very terms of the rules even dictate this:
The STRIKE ZONE is that area over home plate the upper limit
of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of
the shoulders and the top of the uniform pants, and the lower
level is a line at the hollow beneath the kneecap. The Strike
Zone shall be determined from the batter’s stance as the batter
is prepared to swing at a pitched ball.326
Thus, the strike zone expressly takes account of a player’s size
(something outside of the player’s control) and a player’s particular
stance (something within the player’s control). In short, the strike
zone is relative, contextual, and accounts for individual circum-
stances; it is neither uniform nor formally neutral.
More to the point, courts have never stood at arm’s length from,
or acted neutrally toward, civil rights matters. Putative neutrality,
such as the doctrine of colorblindness,327 buoys extant hierarchical
practices and ossifies existing inequalities. In addition, courts have
not hesitated to make value judgments in the opposite direction
when, for centuries, they expressly and unapologetically embraced
and spouted the rhetoric of White supremacy and heteronorma-
tivity—both in civil rights defeats328 and even purported success-
es.329 All the while, we have no shortage of flowery language in the
annals of Supreme Court jurisprudence when the Court has
of Major League Baseball’s strike zone, including those from 1950, 1963, 1969, 1988, and
1996).
325. See, e.g., Douglas O. Linder, Strict Constructionism and the Strike Zone, 56 UMKC L.
REV. 117 (1987) (noting the discrepancy between the strike zone detailed in the Major League
Baseball rule book and how it is actually applied).
326. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES 153 (2019), http://content.mlb.
com/documents/2/2/4/305750224/2019_Official_Baseball_Rules_FINAL_.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9CFT-UZQB].
327. See supra Part I.B.2.
328. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857).
329. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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protected the rights of heterosexuals,330 Christians,331 or even Major
League Baseball.332 Given the gravitas of the Court’s pronounce-
ments, the ripple effects that its findings cause both legally and
socially, and the importance of vindicating dignitary interests in
matters of equal protection, it is reasonable to demand the same
when the Court is called upon to protect the rights of racial and
sexual minorities and other groups that have suffered from animus
at the hands of the majority. It is high time for the Supreme Court
to offer us a firm and unequivocal rejection of the oppressive
doctrines of the past and an affirmative celebration of dignitary
interests of individuals from targeted groups. And when such a mo-
ment occurs, it needs to happen in a more appropriate setting than
a disaffirmance of past inhumanities while rendering new ones.
Second, one might criticize the linear view of progress implied by
the taxonomy. The taxonomy is imbued with a normative vision of
what constitutes evolution.333 This position is eminently debatable
and admittedly riddled with value judgments—judgments that are
330. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (concluding the decision
finding a constitutional right to contraceptive access for, of course, married heterosexual
couples with what Bill Eskridge has called a “lavish ode to heterosexual marriage,” Eskridge,
supra note 161, at 1065).
331. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (asserting that “‘[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,’” and beginning its lengthy
tracing of the role of religion (qua Christianity) in American life and institutions by stating
that “[o]ur history is replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine
guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary
leaders” in rejecting the separation of church and state doctrine and claims that a nativity
scene in a city’s Christmas display violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause
(quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952))). For a critique of Lynch, see Janet L.
Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National ‘Religion’, 39 MERCER L. REV.
495, 502, 504 (1988) (“The majority opinion ... plays on the familiarity until it practically
mandates the inclusion of Christianity in the definition of ‘American.’ ... [I]n Lynch, the Court
at one point suggests that the crèche is not a religious object at all, but the representation of
an historical event. By extension, Christianity becomes not one religion among many but a
‘national’ religion with a unique historical veracity.” (footnote omitted)).
332. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972) (beginning its decision affirming
baseball’s antitrust exemption with a grandiloquent, five-page ode to baseball history that is
highlighted by a lengthy list of the game’s immortals). For a further analysis of the Supreme
Court’s romanticism over baseball and its detrimental impact on the protection of civil rights,
see generally John Tehranian, It’ll Break Your Heart Every Time: Race, Romanticism and the
Struggle for Civil Rights in Litigating Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 46 HOFSTRA L.REV. 947
(2018).
333. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013) (referring to an “evolving
understanding of the meaning of equality”).
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unabashedly reflected in the model’s nomenclature of paternalism,
tolerance, and acceptance, which implies a progression. But the
taxonomy does not mean to suggest that achievement of its version
of evolution occurs in a linear manner or that it is even achievable
at all. For example, the colorblindness jurisprudence of the modern
era—chiefly related to resistance to affirmative action and other
remedial race-based policies—reflects a return to first-order, proto-
tolerant values.334
Meanwhile, recent decisions, such as Trump v. Hawaii, make
clear that movement along the orders of protection is certainly not
unidirectional.335 In Trump, the Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ments of several lower courts that had consistently found that the
Trump Administration’s order barring entry of citizens from certain
countries into the United States violated the Equal Protection
Clause by primarily targeting Muslims.336 Elevating facial “color-
blindness” over impact and intent and echoing the superficial
formalism of the proto-tolerant courts of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, the majority blithely pointed out that
334. See supra Part I.B.2.
335. See 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing President
Trump’s campaign statements regarding the travel ban).
336. Id. at 2423. The first version of the ban, Executive Order 13769, issued on January
27, 2017, barred for ninety days entry into the United States for citizens from seven
countries—Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen—all of which are Muslim
majority. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017); Alison Siskin,
President Trump’s Executive Order on Suspending Entry of Select Foreign Nationals: The
Seven Countries, CRS INSIGHT (Feb. 1, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN10642.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SQ7E-CBCB] (listing the seven countries covered under the Order and how
they were designated under the Immigration Nationality Act § 217(a)(12)); Louise Cainkar,
The Muslim Ban and Trump’s War on Immigration, MIDDLE E. REP. ONLINE (June 1, 2020),
https://merip.org/2020/06/the-muslim-ban-and-trumps-war-on-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/
3AZJ-UNQE] (“This executive order and its later iterations are widely known as the Muslim
ban because the countries selected are Muslim-majority.”). The revised version of the ban,
issued on March 6, 2017, as Executive Order 13780, continued to bar citizens of the same
seven countries from entry into the country but created exemptions for permanent U.S.
residents and current visa holders, and it dropped language in the previous Order offering
preferential status to certain persecuted religious minorities. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82
Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017). The executive orders then gave way to the third and ultimate
version of the ban, which ended up before the Supreme Court: Proclamation No. 9645 was
issued on September 24, 2017, and added citizens of two non-Muslim majority countries
(North Korea and certain Venezuelan government officials). See Proclamation No. 9645, 82
Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
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the ban “says nothing about religion” on its face.337 Therefore, there
was nothing constitutionally untoward going on.338 Such a posture
was remarkable enough given the undisputed reality that the pol-
icy resoundingly and disproportionately affected Muslim indi-
viduals.339
The facts were even more favorable for the plaintiffs than they
were in Cumming. In Cumming, the pretext of fiscal economy, in the
absence of any overt record of targeting African Americans, sus-
tained the shuttering of the only African American high school in
Richmond County.340 In Trump, by sharp contrast, the Court had
the benefit of cavalier statements from the architect of the policy,
who had no compunction about making its discriminatory intent
manifest.341 As Donald Trump had unapologetically told the whole
world, he was seeking “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States.”342 In an era when even the most nox-
ious bigot is usually (legally) circumspect enough to conceal any
animus driving a policy, Trump showed no such restraint. His intent
could hardly be clearer. As the Supreme Court once concluded in a
very different context, “[t]he unlawful objective” should have been
“unmistakable.”343 But despite the existence of this rare gift, which
seemingly overcame even Washington v. Davis’s onerous intent
requirement,344 the Court held otherwise.345
In the process, the Court broke from its prior equal protection
jurisprudence involving fundamental rights (such as the freedom of
religion) and declined to apply anything more than rational basis
review to the ban.346 Meanwhile, ironically, there was nary a
337. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.
338. Id. at 2423.
339. See Cainkar, supra note 336.
340. Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899); see supra Part
I.B.1.
341. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
342. Id. (citing formal statement issued by Donald Trump on December 7, 2015, which
remained on his campaign website until May 2017—several months into his presidency and
during the time when the first two executive orders were issued).
343. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005).
344. See 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that to subject a facially neutral law to heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiff must meet the burden of showing
that the law has both a discriminatory intent and disparate impact).
345. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
346. See id. at 2441 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[W]ithout explanation or precedential
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whisper of the rich body of recent case law dictating absolute gov-
ernmental “colorblindness”—at least when policies that adversely
impact the White majority are concerned.347
Most disingenuously of all, the majority opinion took the Trump
case (rather than any of the other myriad chances it had decided
over the past seventy years) as an opportunity to grandstand by
abrogating its infamous holding348 in Korematsu v. United States,
which had affirmed the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II.349 By overruling Korematsu in a transparent attempt
to lend an air of legitimacy to its actions banning Muslims, the
Court diminished the (otherwise significant) act of finally relegating
Korematsu to the dustbin of history. Ironically, in the process, the
Court rendered a decision that may well be regarded by future
observers as our own generation’s Korematsu—assuming nothing
worse comes along.350
All the while, the Court’s ruling was wildly inconsistent with its
holding on a related issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, an opinion that it had issued just days before.351
In that case, the Court held that statements indicative of religious
animus by a civil rights commission behind a facially neutral an-
tidiscrimination law in Colorado would result in the striking of its
application to a devout Christian baker who declined to make a
support, [the majority] limits its review of the Proclamation to rational-basis scrutiny.... That
approach is perplexing, given that in other Establishment Clause cases, including those in-
volving claims of religious animus or discrimination, this Court has applied a more stringent
standard of review.” (citation omitted)); see also Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d
1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that Supreme Court precedent has established that claims
“involving discrimination on the basis of religion, including interdenominational
discrimination, are subject to heightened scrutiny whether they arise under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause” (citations omitted)).
347. See supra Part I.B.2.
348. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“The dissent’s reference to Korematsu ... affords this Court
the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the
day it was decided [and] has been overruled in the court of history.”).
349. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
350. This is not to suggest that the banning of certain noncitizen Muslims from our country
constitutes anywhere near the injustice that was perpetrated through the forced internment
of more than a hundred thousand individuals of Japanese descent, many of whom were
American citizens. See Japanese American Internment, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/event/Japanese-American-internment [https://perma.cc/6XGA-4YFA].
351. See 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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wedding cake for a same-sex couple getting married.352 In light of
the logic of Masterpiece Cakeshop, it is difficult to explain how
repeated statements by the President of the United States and those
in the Administration implementing his policy indicating the naked
religious animus behind the adoption of the “Muslim ban” would not
have a similar effect.
As Trump indicates, although we have achieved great progress,
we still have important strides to make. At the risk of being deemed
uppity ingrates with respect to the kind drops of tolerance the
Supreme Court has given us, we can and should ask for more.353
While the civil rights decisions that we have lionized certainly
deserve recognition for their value, they should not be so valorized
and their shortcomings not so whitewashed that we immunize them
from further scrutiny. We should instead acknowledge their limi-
tations and recognize the ways in which they have continued to
tolerate, if not prop up, inequality by failing to embrace a true vision
of acceptance that undermines subordination practices and resists
racial (and other forms of ) hierarchy. Civil rights advocates may
fear attacking these critical decisions, which ultimately went their
way, lest they appear to be “nattering nabobs of negativi[ty].”354 But,
if we chose to simply say “thank you” and sit silent, we have far
more to lose.
352. Id. at 1729 (“The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled
was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has
some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that
motivated his objection.”).
353. As Jack Chin has argued, the lionization of Harlan’s dissent may well flow from the
fact that come Brown, “[e]mbarrassed whites could point out that even six decades earlier, at
least one white authority figure had rejected what turned into the legal, moral, and political
disaster of Jim Crow.... Harlan’s dissent may also look particularly attractive when compared
to the meagerness of the majority opinion, rightly called one of the ‘outstanding failures of
American law.’... After a hundred years, Harlan’s Plessy dissent should be overruled.” Chin,
supra note 27, at 180, 182 (footnotes omitted). The same could be said of the other seemingly
progressive decisions from the Jim Crow era, such as Strauder.
354. See Lance Morrow, Naysayer to the Nattering Nabobs, TIME MAG. (Sept. 30, 1996),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,985217,00.html [https://perma.cc/4M23-
SHUH] (quoting the famous line first uttered by former Vice President Spiro Agnew).
